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Applicant faking behavior (AFB) on personality measures has been a longstanding challenge for both researchers and practitioners. Applicant faking behavior
is widely defined as a deceptive act that is intended to create a favorable impression
(Goffin & Boyd, 2009). The research in this area has evolved with heightened
focus on bolstering its theoretical foundation and establishing a consistent and
effective operationalization of AFB. This research utilizes archival data from a
within-subject design with a sample of job applicants; a procedure that has been
recognized as the “gold standard” of the AFB literature (Ryan & Boyce, 2006).
Structural Equation Modelling resulted in partial support for the
hypothesized relationships and the adoption of The Composite Model of the
Attitude-Behavior Relation (Eagly and Chaiken, 1993) for explaining AFB. The
results of this study provided valuable insights into the dynamics between potential
antecedents of applicant faking behavior. Three primary conclusions for this study
include: (1) Habit of Deception, as currently measured, is not a viable direct or
indirect antecedent of AFB, (2) in addition to Attitude toward AFB, Attitude
toward Personality Measures should be included in the AFB story, and (3)
Idealistic Ethical Position, as many previously theorized, is a significant predictor
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of Intention to Fake. Implications, limitations, and suggestions for future research
are discussed.
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Introduction
For every 10 minutes of conversation, people tell approximately three lies
(Smith, 2004). In fact, most of us engage in deception every day (Depaulo, Kashy,
Kirkendol, Dwyer, & Epstien, 1996). It should then be no surprise that deception
occurs in personnel selection contexts. In order to obtain a desired job, many
applicants are willing to deceive their way to the top of their respective applicant
pool. This specific form of deception – referred to in the remaining of the paper as
applicant faking behavior (AFB) - is an applicant’s conscious selfmisrepresentation to create a favorable impression when completing a personality
measure (Goffin & Boyd, 2009). Applicant faking on non-cognitive measures has
been a long standing concern for both practitioners and researchers (Zickar &
Gibby, 2006). There is considerable evidence that not only can applicants fake
(Hough & Paullin, 1994; McFarland & Ryan, 2000; Rosse, Stecher, Miller, &
Levin, 1998; Ryan & Sackett, 1987; Viswesvaran & Ones, 1999), but mounting
evidence that they do fake (Donovan, Dwight & Hurtz, 2003; Griffith,
Chmielowski, & Yoshita, 2007; Griffith & Converse, 2012), and that faking
negatively impacts personnel selection (Griffith et al., 2007; Griffith, Lee, Peterson,
& Zickar, 2011; Saldago, 2016).
Much of early faking research focused its attention on finding a “silver
bullet” or “cure” for the problem. Now, with an increased mindfulness for the
complexity of the behavior, research has directed its focus toward a strong
theoretical understanding of the phenomenon prior to attempts at applied solutions.
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Over two decades old, faking theory has focused largely on situational-, trait-, and
personality-based factors, but many questions remain unresolved. One underaddressed component regards the attitudinal antecedents that drive AFB. This study
aims to provide additional theoretical development, and tests of the Composite
Model of the Attitude–Behavior Relation (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993) in the context
of AFB. The purpose of this dissertation is not to present a new model per se, but
rather to present an alternative framework for future research to build on and
integrate within existing theory. This dissertation, then, investigates how the
Composite Model of the Attitude–Behavior Relation can inform and integrate with
modern AFB theory.
The Composite Model of the Attitude–Behavior Relation was initially
developed as an integration of existing attitude theory, namely the Theory of
Planned Behavior (TPB; (Ajzen, 1985). Theory of Planned Behavior suggests that
intention to perform a particular behavior can be predicted by the combination of
an individual’s attitude, subjective norms, and perceived behavioral control toward
that behavior. TPB has received extensive empirical support for a variety of
behaviors such as exercise (Nguyen, Potvin, & Otis (1997), dieting (Conner, Kirk,
Cade, & Barrett, 2003), environmental behavior (2005), weight control (McConnon
et al., 2012), and mobile learning readiness (Cheon, Lee, Crooks, & Song (2012).
Further support for TPB’s utility in predicting behavior has been established in
meta-analyses (Armitrage & Conner, 2001; Rivis, Sheeran, and Armitage, 2009).
Relevant to this dissertation, support has been found in TPB’s prediction of AFB
2

using lab based methodologies (Grieve & McSwiggan, 2014; McFarland & Ryan,
2000; McFarland and Ryan, 2006; Mueller-Hanson, Heggestad, Thornton, 2006).
These studies tested the integration of numerous faking-related variables in
addition to those represented in TPB (e.g. ability to fake, conscientiousness, moral
obligation norm, ethical idealism, warning of a lie scale with TPB). Studies using
variables unique to TPB demonstrated mixed results, in part due to their thin
theoretical support and the inconsistent operationalization of variables (McFarland
& Ryan, 2006). This dissertation contribute to the literature by providing a
consistent, empirically substantiated, operationalization of faking behavior and indepth theoretical support in a field-based setting.
Eagly and Chaiken (1993) suggested the addition of habit and self-identity
outcomes to TPB for predicting behavior. These variables are particularly
applicable to AFB. Self-identity outcomes are relevant because of the ethical
dilemma experienced by fakers. As faking is a form of deception (Griffith &
McDaniel, 2006), a person more inclined to deceive in any given situation may be
more likely to fake than a person who is less inclined.
Regarding habit, AFB research suggests the existence of different types of
fakers, including one described as more spontaneous (Griffith, Lee, Peterson, &
Zickar, 2011). A habit for deception may predict this observed faking variance,
where even the presence of small cues may trigger the behavior. In addition to
these variables, Eagly and Chaiken suggested the inclusion of attitude as two
separate constructs: attitude toward behavior and attitude toward target. This
3

reconceptualization provides support for a behavior (e.g. AFB) being perceived
more positively due to the attitude toward the target (e.g. attitude toward selection
measures).
This study uses Eagly and Chaiken’s theoretical approach within the
context of faking behavior (see Figure 1). This model, like TPB, suggests that AFB
is the outcome of one’s intention to perform AFB. However, unlike TPB’s original
conceptualization, AFB is also influenced by the attitude toward AFB and habits of
deception. Additionally, the intention to fake is directly influenced by attitudes
toward AFB, normative outcomes of AFB and idealistic ethical position. Lastly,
attitude toward AFB is suggested to be directly influenced by habits of deception,
attitude toward applicant personality measures, utilitarian outcomes of AFB,
normative outcomes of AFB, and idealistic ethical position. This dissertation
investigates a novel model that incorporates aspects of the Composite Model of the
Attitude–Behavior Relation to determine its value for integration with AFB theory.

Contributions
The primary contribution of this paper is to introduce a novel integration of
attitude theory with AFB. Doing so provides a new path for future research; a
testable avenue that has strong theory and foundations in psychology – until
recently a characteristic lacking in the nascent theoretical faking literature. Further
exploring the attitude perspective increases the understanding of AFB; bolstering
the theoretical foundation on which systematic research with a consistent
4

operationalization and measurement of AFB may follow. This research is also one
of the first theoretical AFB studies to use real job applicant data and thus, is the
first to use field data to explore the integration of attitude theory with AFB.
Exploring this integration has implications for practice as well. The
proposed model may pave the way for AFB interventions in the same way as TPB
has been widely used on various behaviors (e.g. quitting smoking and improved
exercise behavior). With an increased understanding for the antecedents of AFB
provided by this model, methods to deter or mitigate the negative effects of faking
can be established. With a more comprehensive understanding of the variables that
influence AFB, more informed actions can be taken to manipulate AFB.
Overview
This dissertation explored an integration of attitude theory and AFB. In this
paper I first review personality measures, their susceptibility to deception and
summarize the most relevant AFB theory. I then review the relationship between
attitude and behavior with a focus on TPB, and Eagly and Chaiken’s (1993)
theoretical adaptation. I then review the existing AFB literature that integrates
attitude theory before summarizing the study’s hypotheses. Finally, I describe the
methods used to test the hypotheses, and present the analytical approach for the
study.
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Personality Testing
Personality testing is a multibillion dollar industry (Ziegler, McCann, and
Roberts, 2012). It helps academic administrations accept the students that best fit
their universities, psychiatrists to prescribe effective medicines, and grade schools
to determine the most appropriate support path to maximize growth in children.
One of the primary uses of personality tests is in the personnel selection setting
where they are used to help organizations select the right applicants for
employment and promotion. The success of personality testing lies solely on the
accuracy of its assessment and the validity of the subsequent predictions. The more
accurate a personality measure can inform an organization of an applicant’s
standing on non-cognitive traits (e.g. conscientiousness), the more an organization
can confidently predict future applicant performance and fit within their company.
It is this inference that ultimately determines whether or not the individual will be
hired or passed by for a more suitable applicant. In short, personality testing is
valuable to the extent that its results accurately depict the characteristics of the test
taker and their behavior in the future.
A considerable amount of research supports the notion that personality
measures can predict job performance across occupations (Barrick & Mount, 1991;
Ones & Viswesvaran, 2001; Ones, Viswesvaran, & Schmidt, 1993; Rothstein &
Goffin, 2006; Salgado, 2002; Tett & Christiansen, 2007). This conventional
wisdom has led to wide-spread use of personality measures as a tool for employee
selection. In addition to task performance, organizations benefit from other pro6

social behaviors predicted by personality measures. Research supports growing
recognition for the importance of contextual performance in modern work
environments. While cognitive ability predicts task performance, personality tests
demonstrate superior prediction for contextual performance (Borman, Penner,
Allen & Motowidlo, 2001; Hurtz & Donovan, 2000). Personality measures predict
day-to-day behavioral tendencies and are more likely to assess typical performance
or the “will-do” aspects of job performance more so than the “can-do” aspects
(Marcus, Goffin, Johnston, & Rothstein, 2007). Thus, personality measures
compliment cognitive assessments and add significant incremental validity to
selection batteries in assessing the most suitable employees (Schmidt & Hunter,
1998). Including non-cognitive measures in selection batteries also provides a more
well-rounded examination of applicants, enhancing the probability for correct
selection during the decision–making process. In addition, research suggests that
personality tests have minimal adverse impact in comparison to measures of
cognitive ability (Hough, Oswald, & Ployhart, 2001; Ones, Viswesvaran, &
Schmidt, 1993; Sackett, Burns, & Callahan, 1989; Sackett & Wilk, 1994). Lastly,
personality tests are relatively easy and inexpensive to administer, making them
attractive for selection processes, especially to businesses recruiting for positions
with large applicant pools. These advantages have also led to the adoption of
personality measures for increasingly popular unproctored internet-based applicant
screening (Tippins, 2009).
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The benefits and popularity of personality measures is clear; however, some
criticism of personality measures for the use of personnel selection has been offered
in the literature. Researchers have stated that the criterion validity estimates
associated with these selection tools have been disappointing (Morgeson et al.,
2007). Personality measures often have lower criterion related validities when
compared to cognitive ability tests which have long been considered an essential
part of personnel selection due to their predictive power (Motowidlo, Borman, &
Schmitt, 1997). The common criticism that is most relevant to this study, is
personality measures’ susceptibility to manipulation and deception (Douglas,
McDaniel, & Snell, 1996; Hough & Oswald, 2000; McFarland & Ryan, 2000). This
deception has the potential to compromise the accuracy and prediction of
personality testing. Deception within the context of personality measurement is
often specifically referred to as applicant faking behavior (AFB).
Deception
To introduce the concept of deception, I will review the evolution of the
literature and present a contemporary definition. In 1981, Krauss defined deception
as, “an act that is intended to foster in another person a belief or understanding
which the deceiver considers to be false.” This definition implies that deception is
1) an act (whether that be a vocalization or behavior) and 2) is intended to create a
false belief or understanding. Krauss’s definition is robust in that it incorporates an
aspect of intention, an aspect that Mitchell’s (1986) definition leaves out: “a false
communication that tends to benefit the communicator.” Mitchell’s definition does
8

augment Krauss’s delineation by adding that the communicator is a beneficiary of
their deception. We may assume that with a beneficial outcome that this definition
also suggests that a deceiver is motivated by the outcome. Ekman (1992) defined
deception as, “a deliberate choice to mislead a target without giving any
notification of the intent to do so.” This definition emphasizes that deception
requires a deliberate choice, also implying intention. Unlike previous definitions,
Ekman implies that one is not deceiving if they have prepared the target for
deception. Through example, this implication supports that magicians are not
deceiving because their audience is primed to expect deception. This definition also
does not provide insight into the possibility that intentional deception can be
unsuccessful. A detail that Vrij (2001) incorporates in his definition: “a successful
or unsuccessful deliberate attempt, without forewarning, to create in another a
belief which the communicator considers to be untrue.” This definition summarizes
three aspects: (1) the deceiver must believe what they are communicating is false;
(2) there must not be any forewarning of the deception; (3) the deception may or
may not be successful in convincing the target. These three aspects make-up the
most comprehensive definition of deception to date, and are important parameters
involved in deceptions within AFB. For this reason, Vrij’s (2001) modern
definition of deception is used for the remainder of the paper.
Deception, particularly in western culture, is strongly associated with a lack
of morals or integrity (Bok, 1978). And yet deception is all around us; we
participate in it and we are the targets of it. Research suggests that the typical
9

American adult admits to telling at least one lie every 24 hours (Serota, Levine, &
Boster, 2010). And yet we know that most people are not villainous in nature.
Although some of our deception is motivated by harmful intentions and
consequences, for the most part deception is harmless, minor, and serves a
communicative function (DePaulo et al., 1996). At times our deception even serves
to benefit the target (e.g. white lies). Deception is an adaptive characteristic (Smith,
2004) that has evolved over time to help us manipulate people and situations for
our own or others’ benefit (Bond & Robinson, 1988; Smith, 2007).
The source of deception that is most concerning in employee personality
assessment is exhibited from the applicant who holds the end goal of receiving a
job offer. When responding to personality measures, applicants have an opportunity
to manipulate the selection process by responding in a way that is more desirable to
the selector than it is an honest reflection of their personality.
To accomplish their end-goal, a faker’s deception must be successful. There
are many variables that influence whether any deception will be successful and the
extent to which an individual is willing to deceive. These variables apply within the
context of AFB, as well. Once an individual determines that AFB can help obtain
their goal, like any deceiver, the faker evaluates the target and the situation.
From the perspective of a faker, their target is dependent on the applicant’s
intentions, knowledge of the selection process, and moral justifications. Is the
faker’s target the personality measure itself, the administrator of the measure, the
person who will ultimately analyze and score the measure, or the organization?
10

Regardless the applicant is not likely to have a long standing or deep relationship
with the target. Emotion and its relation to morality can be a strong deterrent of
deception. Research suggests that deceivers are less likely to feel the emotional
response of guilt when the target is impersonal or totally anonymous (DePaulo &
Kashy, 1998; Tyler & Feldman, 2004). Therefore, a deceiver is less likely to feel
guilty if their target is not someone or something they are familiar with. In
consideration of the faker’s target or potential targets, it is not likely that guilt will
play a role in preventing that individual from deciding to deceive on personality
measures. For the faker, not only is the target someone they don’t know, the target
isn’t clear. The target may even be perceived to be an object (e.g. the measure, the
organization) rather than a person, further dehumanizing any negative outcome of
the deception.
Another emotional deterrent for a deceiver stems from whether or not they
will get caught. By analyzing the target and possibly the situation, the faker must
decide if an attempt at deception is worth it based on the potential for, and
consequences of being found out. For example, if the deceiver perceives the target
as difficult to mislead and believes the consequences of getting caught are severe,
then they will be less likely to deceive. The reality of a faker’s scenario is that
organizations are unlikely to catch those who deceive, but even if they could, the
consequences would be trivial. As Griffith and McDaniel (2006) put it, “perhaps
they will not get the job, but their name will not appear on a national registry of
known deceivers.” Therefore, the perception of the faker hinges largely on their
11

knowledge of the selection process. For most fakers, any potential negative
outcomes will be perceived as minimal.
The last variable to consider in respect to a target’s influence on effective
deception is Theory of Mind (Premack & Woodruff, 1978). The central concept of
this theory postulates that a deceiver must know and understand what their target
knows in order to architect deception in a way that has the greatest chance of being
perceived by the target as honest. In the case of the applicant, Theory of Mind may
play a crucial role when an applicant is completing a personality measure. The
applicant needs to understand the organization’s “ideal employee” profile to
accurately and effectively deceive. Unfortunately for organizations, most
personality measures consist of transparent items where the “ideal” answer is fairly
clear. Because it is easy for the applicant to understand the make-up of an ideal
employee and common personality items are highly transparent, the underlying task
of Theory of Mind may be relatively simple for a faker.
In addition, applicants may approach personality assessment differently,
depending on their perception of the situation. Applicants may be more likely to
deceive if they believe that other applicants are deceiving. If they are under this
impression, by telling the truth, they are putting themselves at a disadvantage.
Previous research has suggested that 74% of applicants believe that other applicants
were using deception on personality measures (English, Griffith, Graseck, &
Steelman, 2005). This situational perspective and the considerations regarding the
target, provide initial support that the selection process is vulnerable to AFB. AFB
12

would be difficult for applicants if: their target was someone close to them,
someone who could catch and punish them, it was difficult to understand the
applied-for position, and if the situation was not perceived to favor the deceptive.
However, just the opposite is the case: the target is unclear and often anonymous, is
unable to catch them, is easy to deceive, and it may seem like everyone is
advancing their scores through faking. Typically in high stakes settings deception is
risky and emotionally and cognitively taxing, but the selection scenario removes
almost all of these barriers, leading Rosse and colleagues (1998, p. 635) to describe
the applicant setting as an “almost an ideal setting for dissimulation” in particular,
AFB (McFarland & Ryan, 2000).
Applicant Faking Behavior
Callahan (2004) has suggested that we live in a “cheating culture,” where
deceptive behavior for the sake of goal acquisition is the norm. By considering the
viewpoint of applicant fakers, it is not difficult to understand the reasons behind
their actions. We are inundated with stories of prominent members of our culture
who deceive to gain competitive advantage (e.g. professional athletes using
performance enhancement drugs). Given the competitive nature of U.S. culture and
perceived societal demands, some may argue that it is unfair to expect people to
always act honestly; thus, there is no reason to expect different behavior from
applicants.
Applicant faking is an applicant’s conscious self-misrepresentation to create
a favorable impression when completing a personality measure (Goffin & Boyd,
13

2009). Unlike response styles that are consistent over time across items and scales,
faking is a response set that is influenced by the situational demand of the applicant
setting, and personal characteristics.
Concern regarding applicant faking on non-cognitive measures has been a
present almost as long as the measures have existed (Zickar & Gibby, 2006). Unlike
intelligence tests which have verifiable right and wrong answers, applicants can exert
some influence on their scores when responding to personality tests. Research has
reliably demonstrated that applicants are capable of faking when instructed to do so. A
meta-analysis conducted by Viswesvaran and Ones (1999) found that participants
were able to increase their scores by approximately one half standard deviation. The
same study also showed that in between subject designs, all dimensions of the Big
Five personality questionnaire were susceptible to faking with effect sizes ranging
from .48 for agreeableness to .65 for openness to experience. Additionally, effect sizes
for within subject designs ranged from .47 for agreeableness to .89 for
conscientiousness.
There is mounting evidence that not only can applicants fake (Hough &
Paullin, 1994; McFarland & Ryan, 2000; Rosse, Stecher, Miller, & Levin, 1998; Ryan
& Sackett, 1987; and Viswesvaran & Ones, 1999), but they do fake (Griffith &
Converse, 2012; Griffith et al., 2007). In 2007, Griffith et al. conducted an experiment
that explored whether applicants actually elevate their scores in an applicant setting.
Participants completed a personality measure of conscientiousness as applicants, and
one month later completed that same measure with an instructional set asking them to
14

respond to the scale as honestly as possible. The results indicated that a significant
number of applicants faked their scores in the applicant condition. Griffith et al. stated
that at least 31 percent of applicants were categorized as faking. This prevalence of
faking is consistent with findings from other research (Donovan et al. 2003; Griffith &
Converse, 2012). Some research findings have supported estimates upwards of 40 to
50 percent fakers (Donovan et al. 2014; O’Connell et al. 2011). In a summary and
synthesis of the faking literature Griffith and Converse (2012) suggested that in most
U.S. settings approximately 30% (±10%) of applicants fake. This finding has been
supported by a variety of investigative methods including: using non-motivated scores
from research and job applicant settings, measuring non-motivated scores at various
lengths (1 month to 1 year) after the motivated condition, and the use of counterbalance experimental manipulations, controlling for potential order effects.
In 2006, Birkeland and colleagues conducted a meta-analysis comparing job
applicant scores (a motivated setting) to non-job applicant scores (unmotivated).
Across all jobs types, applicants scores significantly higher than their non-applicant
counterparts in extraversion (d=.11), emotional stability (d=.44), conscientiousness
(d=.45), and openness (d=.13). They also found that personality dimensions that were
particularly relevant to the focal job were most vulnerable to faking. In a different
study, as many as 30 – 50% of applicants self-reported engaging in faking behavior
(Donovan et al., 2003).
While the existence of faking in applicant samples has been disputed by
some researchers (e.g. Hogan, Barrett, & Hogan, 2007), tangible evidence of the
15

behavior is now the norm. New strategies and products continue to surface with the
purpose of informing applicants how to fake their selection tests. One such example
is a book titled; Ace the Corporate Personality Test (Hoffman, 2000), which
provides a tutorial for applicants on how to manipulate non-cognitive employment
tests. Thus conventional wisdom now suggests that applicant faking on personality
tests is indeed a reality (Dilchert, Ones, Viswesvaran, & Deller, 2006), and there is
little reason to suspect that this tendency is abating.
The extent to which faking effects the validity of measures continues to be
hotly debated, with some suggesting that faking introduces construct-irrelevant
variance (Rosse et al., 1998). The addition of this unwanted variance has the
potential to harm measurement efforts, and negatively impact hiring decisions. In
personnel selection the purpose of administering measures and analyzing applicant
responses is to improve hiring decisions by choosing the individuals who are most
likely to perform well on the job. To the extent that the administration of a
selection measure leads to improved hiring outcomes we can demonstrate some
evidence of validity. For example, when an applicant fakes on a measure of
extraversion, their resulting test score not only represents their individual
differences in the focal trait, but also introduces variance associated with individual
differences in faking behavior. Therefore, the more fakers that exist in an applicant
pool, the more measurement variance will be due to faking rather than extraversion
(the intended construct). In the extreme scenario where everyone in the applicant
pool is faking on the extraversion measure, the organization is no longer hiring
16

based on who is most extraverted, rather, who is most willing and able to fake
(Ziegler et al., 2012). This phenomenon decreases construct validity; and unless
faking is a better predictor of on-the job performance than extraversion is, it should
decrease criterion validity coefficients as well.
The criterion-related validity coefficient is one of the most highly
referenced statistics when determining the practical value of a selection tool.
Therefore, it is no surprise that much of the applicant response behavior literature
has examined the impact of faking on criterion related validity. When an individual
successfully fakes a personality measure, they may rise in the distribution of scores,
making them more likely to be hired. The fakers that are hired may in turn displace
honest applicants. Thus, a business that hires a faker is actually selecting an
individual who possesses less of the desired trait than honest applicants. Therefore,
said business is hiring employees lower on the traits associated with successful job
performance, and applicants with good job fit are unfairly rejected. Counter
intuitively, as selection ratios become more favorable to the organization more
fakers will be hired, increasing the chances hiring decisions will yield false
positives. This dynamic result is what researchers call hiring discrepancies
(Peterson, Griffith, & Converse, 2009). Griffith et al. (2007) found that with a
selection ratio of .5, 31% of applicants were discrepant hires. At a .1 selection ratio,
this percentage rose to 66%. Thus, research suggest that fakers are causing more
error in the predictor distribution (Mueller-Hanson, Heggestad, & Thornton, 2003)
and are changing rank ordering, especially at the top of the distribution. This may
17

result in disturbances in hiring decision-making, especially in smaller selection
ratios (Rosse, Stecher, Miller, & Levin, 1998).
Although changes in rank-order seem likely, results examining the effects
of faking on criterion-related coefficients have been inconsistent. As suggested by
Rosse et al. (1998), the correlation coefficient insensitivity to rank order changes
may mislead researchers to believe the effects of faking are minimal when
substantial rank-order changes are occurring.
However, an alternative explanation may provide insight on the mixed
results of previous research. Much of the research investigating faking’s effect on
criterion-related validity used social desirability measures as a proxy for faking
behavior to correct personality scores or partial out the effects of social desirability
(SD) from correlations between personality measures and job performance. These
studies typically find little improvement in criterion-related validity (Barrick &
Mount, 1996; Ones et al., 1996; Schmitt & Oswald, 2006), and have suggested that
faking is little more than a nuisance variable. SD scales were designed to detect
fakers by using items in which the desirable response is relatively infrequent in a
normative sample (Burns & Christiansen, 2006). Recent research suggests,
however, that these measures are largely ineffective (see Griffith & Peterson,
2008). Therefore studies using measures of SD as proxies of faking behavior
should be observed with skepticism along with their conclusions regarding faking’s
influence on validity.
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Other studies using different operational definitions of faking have found
consistent negative effects on criterion related validity, particularly studies that
operationalize faking as within subject score change (Douglas et al., 1996; MuellerHanson et al., 2003; Peterson et al. 2011). While many of these studies are lab
studies and have been criticized for the lack of generalizability, similar results are
now emerging from actual applicant settings (Peterson et al., 2011). Using a withinsubjects design, Donavan, Dwight, and Schneider (2014) assessed faking and its
influence on hiring decisions for a pharmaceutical sales position. Using a selfreport measure of dispositional goal orientation pre and post hire, Donovan et al.
classified about half of the participants as fakers on at least one of the three goal
orientation scales. Once hired, the employees were measured by training
performance and again 5 months later using on-the-job sales data. Results indicate
that fakers performed less favorably than non-fakers. Results also indicate that
faking had a negative impact on the psychometric properties of the measure.
Specifically, internal consistencies were lower in the honest setting (post-hire) than
the motivated setting (pre-hire). Additionally, the measurements factor structure
was supported by data collected during the honest setting and was not during the
motivated setting. These results support faking’s negative effects on selection
measures’ construct and criterion validity using a within-subjects design in an
actual organizational setting.
Although evidence is mounting in support for faking’s potential to decrease
the criterion related validity coefficient, some within-subjects designs (Ellingson et
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al. 2007 and Hogan et al. 2007) have suggested otherwise. In regards to the reason
behind these discrepant findings, firstly, both Ellingson et al. and Hogan et al. used
personality measures with dichotomous response options in their operationalization
of faking. This item format is likely to provide less opportunity for faking because
fakers can only respond to the “correct” response option (Donovan et al. 2014). In
contrast, with continuous Likert response options, fakers have the opportunity to
indicate the extent to which they possess the trait being measured. Secondly, Hogan
et al. conclusion that faking is uncommon is predicated on the assumption that
applicants would be less motivated the first time they applied for position than they
would the second time, after they had been rejected. Without having support for
this assumption, one may just as easily assume that motivations would be the same
in these two settings; and therefore, insufficient for measuring faking (Berry &
Sackett, 2009).
Although research to this point has provided less than conclusive results as
to the effects of faking on criterion-related validity, a growing body of literature
provides evidence that faking behavior impacts hiring decisions and the predictive
validity of personality measures. In summary, research continues to provide
support that AFB does occur in applicant settings and can potentially harm
organizational outcomes. Thus, recognizing AFB’s potential impact on personality
testing warrants further examination. However, for the betterment of faking
literature, theory is necessary to organize and accelerate understanding of applicant

20

response processes. This study integrates well-established attitude-behavior theory
to further explore AFB and its primary antecedents.
Attitudes
Researchers hold varied views on the utility and morality of AFB. To some
it is amoral, a conscious decision to lie for the benefit of yourself and the detriment
of others (Goffin & Boyd, 2009). On the other hand, some researchers view faking
as a natural behavioral response to the selection process (Ingold, Kleinman, Konig,
& Melchers, 2015; Marcus, 2009) and those who are most successful at it, deserve
the outcome they seek. Most researchers, however, are somewhere in between these
views, with complex evaluations contingent on the status of numerous variables
including faking degree, stakes, circumstance, and intention. These various
evaluations were heavily debated in the 90’s with the outcome of the debate
suggesting that all of these views are correct to an extent. However, little research
has been conducted to understand how the applicant’s evaluations of faking can
impact their faking behavior. Next, I continue this shift in perspective from taking
an external viewpoint to understanding faking through the applicant lens, namely
through analyzing applicant attitudes.
An attitude is a psychological tendency that is expressed by evaluating a
particular entity with some degree of favor or disfavor (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993).
We can break this definition down into four parts. To be an attitude, the cognition
must be a psychological tendency, implying that this is an internal state. Secondly,
attitude is expressed by an evaluation: a broad descriptor encompassing cognitive,
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affective, and behavioral responses. Thirdly, this evaluation is made toward a
particular entity, and therefore is known by its direct connection with the attitude.
Finally this evaluation can be qualified on a spectrum from favorable to unfavorable.
Although described as a tendency, attitudes do not necessarily exist in only
a moment in time. Instead, attitudes are an internal state that lasts at least a short
time. Tendency should be differentiated from dispositions. To use “disposition”
would imply that all attitudes are relatively stable states that are long-lasting. Some
attitudes carry these characteristics, however, others are malleable and short lived,
particularly in instances in which they are unimportant or only recently introduced
to the possessor of the attitude. Therefore, the preferred term to describe attitudes is
tendency; as it fulfills the necessary generality to encompass states that are both
brief and enduring.
As an evaluation, an attitude’s primary conceptual role in explaining
behavior lies as mediator between certain stimuli and responses. Responses are the
observable expressions of an evaluation. Regardless of the type of response (e.g. a
wide smile), it is informative in construing the unobservable associated evaluation
(e.g. liking or approval). Evaluative responses are expressions of the extent that a
person approves/disapproves, likes/dislikes, approach/avoids, etc. The attitudinal
state that is assumed to underlie an evaluative response is understood to be
positioned on its own continuum ranging from extremely negative to extremely
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positive. In regards to AFB, varying evaluative responses yield varying patterns
and degrees of AFB.
The onset of an evaluation is brought on by an attitude object. Completing
the stimuli-response relationship, an evaluation is made based on an attitudinal
object which often triggers an evaluative response. Attitudinal objects can vary
from abstract (e.g. communism, love) to concrete (e.g. cellphone, admissions test)
entities. They can also be classes of entities (e.g. electronics, selection measures).
Attitude objects can also be behaviors (e.g. AFB, playing baseball) and classes of
behaviors as well. Attitude objects are represented in our observations through a
variety of stimuli. Understanding how attitudes emerge from responses and
selection-related evaluations will inform the attitude-AFB relationship.
A stimuli that is observed, may elicit a response which expresses a certain
degree of evaluation. The underlying assumption of such an occurrence is that the
individual holds an attitude - described by some degree of favorability or
unfavorability - toward the attitude object being represented by the class of stimuli.
When specific stimuli consistently elicits a specific response from an individual, an
inference of that individual’s attitude toward the attitude object can be made. The
stronger the attitude, the more consistent the behavior associated with that attitude
will be. An attitude differentiates from personality traits and mood due to the length
of time an attitude can exist, the specificity of the relationship between an attitude
object’s stimuli, and the evaluative responses that makes up an attitude.
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A measure may prompt attitude formation for applicants. An applicant may
not necessarily have a formed attitude a priori for what is being measured. If an
individual perceives that it may be beneficial to have an attitude about an object
they may spontaneously form one in the moment (Fazio, 1990). Therefore, an
applicant may form an attitude about AFB spontaneously if they don’t previously
have one. Whether attitudes are developed spontaneously or not, attitudes toward
an object should be a good predictor of behavior (Ajzen & Fishbien, 2005).
However, easily accessible and strong attitudes are suggested to have more value
than spontaneously formed attitudes at predicting behavior. If a past attitude is not
strong enough to influence a situation and an attitude is not spontaneously
generated, research suggests that an individual’s behavior will be influenced by
cues of the attitude object or the situation.
Classes of Evaluations
The evaluation of an attitude is expressed as three classes: cognition, affect,
and behavior (Eagly & Chaiken, 2007); also known as the three-component model.
Cognitive evaluations are often described as beliefs, or the associations developed
between the attitude object and its attributes. They are the thoughts and ideas about
the attitude object and can be expressed internally or externally via verbal
communication. Being evaluative also implies that the cognitive response can range
from extremely negative to extremely positive. Extremely negative evaluations are
less likely to be associated with positive attributes, whereas extremely positive
evaluations are less likely to be associated with negative attributes. For example,
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some applicants may believe that responding honestly to personality measures is to
the benefit of the organization and employee fit. This belief links the attitude object
(faking behavior) to a positive attribute (beneficial to employee fit).
Affective responses consist of the moods, emotions, and feelings related to
an attitude object. As with cognitive responses, affective ones can also range from
extremely negative to extremely positive. People who favorably evaluate an
attitude object are more likely to have positive affective responses and less likely to
have negative affective responses from it and vice-versa. For example, when
thinking about others’ AFB and its impact on fair assessment, one may have an
emotional response of anger toward those individuals and/or the assessment
process.
Although all evaluative responses are important to consider for AFB
research, the most pertinent to this study is behavioral; specifically overt behaviors.
Individuals who evaluate an attitude object favorably are more likely to foster or
support it than individuals who evaluate the attitude object unfavorably. Faking on
personality measures is an indication that the faker holds a favorable evaluation of
deception through AFB. Behavioral responses also encompass intentions, which are
not considered overt. Although an applicant may have the intention to fake, they
may be unsuccessful without the ability or opportunity to fake. Like overt
behavioral responses, supportive and unsupportive intentions are related to positive
and negative intentions, respectively.
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The three-component model has received inconsistent statistical support
(Ajzen & Fishbein, 2005). However, the conceptualization of the model remains
useful for understanding how attitudes are formed and expressed. This model is
used in this study to illustrate the relation between attitudes toward AFB and the
behavior itself.

The Impact of Attitudes on Behaviors
As reviewed, attitudes or tendencies to evaluate an entity with some degree
of favor or disfavor, are commonly expressed in cognitive, affective and behavioral
responses. People who have positive attitudes are more likely to take actions that
approach or support the attitude object whereas people with negative attitudes are
more likely to take actions that resist or deter the attitude object. Researchers do
not, however, always expect high correlations between attitudes and behaviors
because neither attitudes nor behaviors are assessed with perfect validity and
attitudes are only one of many antecedents of behavior. The relationship we expect
between attitudes and behaviors are of a moderate, or even small magnitude. This
holds true for AFB as well. Faking is a complex behavior and addressing AFB will
require more than just a silver bullet solution. The purpose of this research is not to
fully predict AFB, but instead to explore a new application of a well-supported
theoretical model to uncover the role attitudes play in AFB. Thus, this study
reviews the attitude-behavior relationship more closely before more specifically
exploring the relationship between attitudes and AFB.
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Smaller correlations were often demonstrated in early research that was
focused on broad attitudes such as attitudes toward ethnicities, nationalities and
governmental policies. These broader attitudes are much better at predicting
aggregated behaviors than a more focused behavior. For example, an attitude
toward deception may have influence on a number of behaviors including lying to
friends, stealing from their employer, or faking on an application. But although an
attitude toward deception may influence the likelihood that these behaviors occur
or do not occur, there are a number of other factors that determine their actual
occurrence. For example, faking on a personality measure for a job may also be
influence by how much the individual likes the job they are applying for, how
many job opportunities they have, and whether they have the ability to fake
successfully. A single behavior may not be a good indicator of an attitude, however
the aggregate of many behaviors can be. The confounding influences from the
single behavior are cancelled out upon multiple varying observations. Thus,
correlations between attitudes and aggregated indices of attitude-relevant behaviors
will be stronger than correlations between general attitudes and singular behaviors.
This aggregation of behaviors, also known as a multiple-act criterion, is a better
consequence for broad attitudes to predict (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1974).
This phenomenon was later summarized by Ajzen and Fishbein (1977) by
stating that attitudes and behaviors should be correspondent to support strong
correlations. The primary principle of correspondence theory outlines that general
attitudes (e.g. attitudes toward ethnicity, religion, etc.) are good predictors of
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general behaviors or aggregated behaviors. More specific attitudes, however, are
better predictors of specific behaviors. In other words, the relevant attitudes and
behaviors should be defined at an equivalent level of specificity. This equivalency
is further broken down into four specific elements of: action, target, context, and
time. The attitude and behavior should be similar in specificity on all elements.
Every behavior (1) consists of a specific action (2) performed toward a target (3) in
context and (4) at a time. For example, an applicant (1) fakes (2) a personality
measure (3) sitting at a desk on a computer (4) the morning of February 4th. Each of
these elements can range in their specificity. Therefore, a behavior can be assessed
as (1) a single action or a range of actions, (2) toward a single target or a range of
targets (3) in a specific context or a range of context, and (4) at a single time or a
range of times.
An attitude target is more often than not distinct from an attitude object
(Eagly and Chaiken, 1993, p 163). The attitude target, such as a personality
measure in the example above, is an entity of which a behavior is directed towards.
Although an attitude object can be a target (e.g. attitude toward a personality
measure), it can also incorporate the same elements of behavior (action, target,
context, and time). For example, an applicant will have an attitude toward AFB a
personality measure using a computer in the morning.
If the object is the behavior (e.g. AFB), the target is that which the behavior
is directed towards (e.g. the personality measure). When the only attitude object
element specified is the target (e.g. attitude toward personality measures) all other
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elements must be assumed to be all encompassing (e.g. attitude toward personality
measures in consideration of all behaviors, in all contexts, and at all times).
Similarly to attitudes toward targets, attitude towards behavior in which the action
is the only element specified, all other elements are considered all encompassing
(e.g. attitude toward AFB in consideration of all targets, in all contexts, and at all
times). An attitude toward a behavior and the attitude toward the target are two
different attitudes that many studies do not distinguish. This dissertation is the first
AFB study to use both attitude types in the prediction of AFB.
In addition to correspondence theory, attitude research has determined
conditions that maximize attitude-behavior prediction. Increased behavioral
prediction occurs when an attitude is: held with confidence (as opposed to
uncertainty), decisiveness (as opposed to ambivalence), is easily recalled (as
opposed to difficult to recall), and is developed from direct experience (as opposed
from indirect experience) (Kraus, 1995).
The Theory of Reasoned Action
Behavioral intention was the catalyst for the modern research on the
attitude-behavior relationship. It was suggested that intention was the most
proximal antecedent to behavior and attitudes influence behavior through intentions
(Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975). An intention is a person’s
motivation to put forth energy toward a behavior (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). By
stating that intention is the sole primary antecedent, their Theory of Reasoned
Action (TRA; See figure 3; Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975) only
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explained planned behavior, not spontaneous behavior – which would not have
intention. Additionally, this theory assumes that attitudes do not have an impact on
unplanned behaviors, whether they are spontaneous or have developed habitually.
This theory focuses on attitudes toward behaviors and not toward a target
(reviewed in detail below). Attitude toward behavior is one of the two primary
antecedents to intentions. The second antecedent is subjective norm, or the belief an
individual has regarding the extent to which their significant others (i.e. anyone
who may have a perception of the individual-behavior relationship that is important
to them) would or would not support the behavior. Thus, an individual’s evaluation
of engaging in a behavior and their belief of significant others’ support for
engaging in that behavior drives the individual’s intention to behave. Applied to
AFB, an applicant’s attitude toward AFB and an applicant’s perception of whether
significant others would support AFB, drive the intention the applicant would have
to fake. This intention drives the AFB. According to this theory, no other variables
have significant influence on intentions. All other variables influence only through
these primary antecedents.
The determinants of attitudes toward behaviors and subjective norms is
most commonly explained by the expectancy-value framework (Vroom, 1964). An
attitude is determined by beliefs of the behavior’s perceived consequences. The
expectancy-value model defines consequences as the product of the subjective
likelihood that the act will result in a specified consequence (expectancy) and
evaluation of that consequence (value). This product is multiplied with all other
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expectancy x value products associated with other consequences of the behavior.
Research has demonstrated that people who have high intention to behave believe
that the consequence is more positive and more likely to happen in comparison to
those with low intentions who believe the behavior has less positive consequences
and a smaller probability of the occurrence of the consequence. Additionally,
individuals with strong intentions believe there are less negative consequences with
a smaller probability of occurrence whereas individuals with low intentions believe
there are greater negative consequences with greater probability of occurrence. As
applied to the second antecedent, subjective norm, the expectancy x value
framework suggests that it is the sum of an individual’s perceptions of all
significant others’ beliefs that the person should perform the behavior times that
person’s motivation to comply with all significant others’ beliefs.
Applicants do not consider all subjective norms and attitudes thoroughly
before calculatedly determining their intentions and then behaving. Rather, as
Ajzen and Fishbein (1980) specify, the applicant would have previously developed
their norms, attitudes, and intentions. In the moment of faking, they may only
consciously consider one or a couple variables to establish their intention.
The Theory of Reasoned Action has been supported in a variety of research
settings, such as voting (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980), infant feeding practices
(Manstead, Proffitt, & Smart, 1983), and purchasing prescription drugs (Brinberg
& Cummings, 1983). Meta-analyses from Sheppard, Hartwick, and Warshaw
(1988) and Van den Putte (1991) reported correlations of .66 and .68 respectively,
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for the predicting of intention from attitude subjective norm. These meta-analyses
reported correlations of .53 and .62 respectively, for the relation between intention
and behavior. It is suggested that these may be conservative estimates based on the
studies inclusion of research studying not fully volitional behaviors. The Theory of
Reasoned Action suggests that correlations are weaker when studying behaviors
that are less volitional.
Despite widespread support, the Theory for Reasoned Action has its critics.
A primary critique of the Theory of Reasoned Action comes from its predictability
of behaviors that require ability and skill. The theory is limited in its predictability
to simple actions that require mostly only motivation to achieve. Although
previously described as relatively easy to execute, AFB does require a level of skill
in ability especially in comparison to common attitude-focused research behaviors
such as voting or going to church. Although these behaviors require effort, there is
very little skill involved. Therefore, the Theory for Reasoned Action would not
strongly predict AFB due, at least partially, to the skill and ability necessary for
successful AFB. Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) suggest that the individuals without
enough skill to complete the behavior likely lack complete understanding of that
behavior. If they lack the necessary skills, once the behavior is attempted and
failed, intentions will change and better align to behavior on subsequent attempts.
This point becomes at least partially moot as it applies to AFB. Most applicants,
who attempt to fake, will not receive the necessary feedback to make the
appropriate adjustment in intentions for future behaviors. To successfully fake, an
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individual must have the ability and skill to: (1) accurately evaluate their own selfconcept, (2) have an understanding of personality measures, how they work, and
apply that understanding towards AFB, (3) have a strong knowledge of the job they
are applying for and its requirements, (4) apply that knowledge in the interpretation
of the personality measures’ items in order to determine the desired response, and
(5) apply these actions and knowledge appropriately to every item in each measure.
These are all variables that the Theory for Reasoned Action would not account for
in the prediction of behavior.
Theory of Planned Behavior
To address the critique that the Theory of Reasoned Action is limited to
volitional behaviors requiring little ability and skill, Ajzen (1991) expanded on the
theory by developing the TPB (See Figure 4). The TPB is meant to account for
behaviors that require resources, opportunity, and skills; those more difficult to
execute in comparison to the behaviors predicted by the Theory of Reasoned
Action.
To account for behaviors requiring more resources, opportunity, and skill
TPB introduced “perceived behavioral control” to the model. Perceived behavioral
control is defined as an individual’s perception of how easy or difficult the
performance of the behavior of interest will be. Control beliefs, or beliefs deciding
whether the individual has enough resources, opportunity, and skills necessary to
perform the behavior, is suggested as the primary driver of perceived behavioral
control. Perceived behavioral control impacts behavior through intentions as well
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as directly. The direct relationship is concerned less with the perception but rather
with the reality of the skills, opportunities, and resources necessary to perform the
behavior. Ajzen (1991) uses perceived behavioral control as a proxy for actual
control because of the latter’s unpredictability (e.g. sickness, accidents, weather).
Ajzen (1991) reviewed twelve studies using TPB to predict various
behaviors including playing video games, voting choice, shoplifting, and giving a
gift. The results showed that the TPB was a better predictor for behavior and
intentions than the Theory of Reasoned Action. Ajzen concluded that the TPB is a
more comprehensive model, capable of predicting behaviors requiring more
resources, opportunity, and skills.
Although more comprehensive, the TPB still has received criticism. First, as
suggested by Eagly and Chaiken (1993), a causal link between perceived
behavioral control and intentions suggests that individuals perform their behaviors
for the sole reason that they are able to. This becomes especially questionable with
certain behaviors. For example, although an individual has the control to vote for a
politician they do not believe in or to respond randomly to a personality measure;
they likely would not intend to perform these behaviors solely because they can.
Secondly the TPB omits many well-supported drivers of intentions, including:
morality and habit. Ajzen remains open to the possibility that additional variables
added to the model could better predict certain behaviors. These variables are
included in this study’s hypotheses and are explained in further detail within the
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section: Composite Model of the Attitude–Behavior Relation (Eagly and Chaiken,
1993).
Attitudes toward Targets
Many theories have built from or added to the TPB to explain behavior in
its more complex forms. Eagly and Chaiken (1993) add to the discussion by
proposing the inclusion of attitudes toward targets or in other words, attitudes
toward the entity a behavior is directed.
Fazio’s (1990) research provides the most detail on attitudes toward targets
via an automatic processing model that outlines the primary mediators between
attitude and behavior. This processing sequence initiates when an individual
interacts with attitude objects. This automatically triggers the individual to access
(without conscious effort) from memory the evaluation associated with the attitude
target. When the attitude is accessed it affects the individual’s perceptions of the
attitude object. Upon activation of a favorable or unfavorable attitude, positive or
negative attributes are assigned to the object. These assigned attributes partially
make up the definition of the event (Fazio, 1986). Similarly to Fishbein and Ajzen,
normative factors may also influence the event. Therefore, the definition of the
event is comprised of normative factors and the influence of attitudes on the initial
perception of the attitude object. The definition then determines behavior.
Fazio’s model on the effect of attitudes on behavior has received criticism
for its description of the more proximal drivers of behavior. In Fazio’s model, the
definition of the event is the last process before the behavior which, “simply
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follows” (Fazio 1996, p. 237). Behavior is described as following the definition,
“without any necessary conscious reasoning process” (Fazio, 1986, p. 237). Left
under-explained are important, previously discussed variables including attitudes
toward behaviors, intentions, habits, scripts, and plans. Even with these drawbacks,
Fazio’s model remains a complementary addition to the existing attitude theory
with the inclusion of the processes through which attitude toward targets can
influence behavior. This link between attitude toward targets and the highly
supported TPB influenced the eventual development of Eagly and Chaiken’s
Attitude-Behavior Model. The attitude toward target variable has not been explored
in AFB research and may provide a valuable and novel approach with additional
insights into the predictors of AFB.
Relevance Principle
Relevance principal contends that activated attitudes affect behavior only if
they are viewed as related and have potential as appropriate guidelines (Eagly &
Chaiken, 1993). An individual needs to perceive their attitude as relevant for it to
affect behavior. Therefore, for an attitude to be impactful on behavior it needs to be
accessible and relevant. Borgida and Campbell (1982) added that the attitude that is
both accessible and relevant must not be countered by confounding considerations.
For instance an applicant may perceive a personality test as unfair and often faked.
This attitude may influence an individual to fake; however, this attitude may be
negated by the countering consideration that AFB would make the individual feel
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overwhelmingly guilty. Feeling guilty in this example, is the confounding
consideration.
Relevance principle research provides explanation for how certain attitudes
may impact behavior. This principle explains that the automatic processing that
occurs when an individual is first presented with attitude object cues, is not, within
itself, enough to impact behavior. When exploring the impact of attitudes, AFB
research has only considered an applicant’s attitude toward AFB, not their attitude
toward the target, the personality measure. For example, if an applicant perceives
personality measures as an unreliable test that most applicants fake, that applicant
will likely form a negative attitude toward the behavior of taking the personality
measure. However, this negative attitude toward personality measures will not
impact behavior unless it is relevant and accessible. Existing theory still lacks,
however, in explaining the processes involved from the moment an attitude is
activated from the attitude object cues to its influence on and the eventual action of
behavior. Eagly and Chaiken (1993) have started this conversation within the
attitude research and this study furthers that conversation as it applies to AFB.
Composite Model of the Attitude–Behavior Relation (Eagly and Chaiken,
1993)
In 1993, Eagly and Chaiken developed a single model as a composite of the
models that were based on attitude toward behavior and those based on attitudes
toward targets (see figure 5). This model explains behavior’s emergence from 5 key
variables: attitudes toward targets, utilitarian outcomes, normative outcomes, self37

identity outcomes, and habits. Many of these, particularly habits and self-identity
outcomes, aim to fill what critics of TPB thought were key omissions (e.g. Terry et
al., 1990; Smith et al., 2010). Attitudes toward targets are defined as evaluations of
targets of behavior. Utilitarian outcomes are the rewards and punishments that are
anticipated to result from the behavior. Normative outcomes are those that regard
significant others’ approval or disapproval of the behavior. Self-identity outcomes
are the anticipatory outcomes for one’s self concept following the behavior. Lastly,
Habits are defined as behaviors that are mostly automatic and do not require much
conscious thought to activate.
Similar to Fazio’s (1986) automatic processing model, attitude toward
target has direct influence on attitude toward behavior. Attitudes toward targets do
not influence behavior directly. An individual must translate their attitude toward a
behavior into a behavioral option. Attitude toward a target must first influence an
individual’s attitude toward a behavior before action is taken. In addition, this
approach explains that attitudes toward behaviors can also be influenced by habits.
This is counter to TPB in that attitudes toward behavior are primarily predicted by
behavioral beliefs and anticipatory outcomes. The final key deviation between
Eagly and Chaiken with TPB is that normative and self-identity outcomes can have
a direct impact on intentions. This relationship is similar to social norms in the
Theory of Reasoned Action.
Within their attitude-behavior model, the three anticipatory outcomes for a
potential behavior vary in their influence. Normative outcomes are expected to
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influence AFB via the same mechanisms as proposed by TPB: through attitude
toward the behavior and intention to behave. Utilitarian outcomes is proposed to
influence attitude toward AFB. If an applicant believes that AFB results in positive
outcomes, that applicant will be more likely to think favorably about AFB than the
applicant who believes AFB will result in negative outcomes. This proposed
relationship is partially supported by TPB, labelled in their model as a similar
variable of perceived behavioral outcomes.
As mentioned above, a variable that is often criticized as a key omission to
TPB is Morality. Morality can be defined as individual’s personal perception of
right and wrong. Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) defend this omission by citing
intention as confounding the prediction value of morality. Research has found that
morality can predict intention above and beyond attitude and subjective norm (e.g.
Sparks & Shepherd, 2002). Morality has been shown to play a particularly
influential role in unethical behavior such as lying (Beck & Ajzen, 1991).
Eagly and Chaiken’s model introduces a variable similar to morality, selfidentity outcomes. These perceived outcomes are suggested to influence attitude
toward AFB and intentions to fake. Self-identity outcomes are an important
consideration in AFB’s emergence because of the ethical dilemma experienced by
fakers. Deception is often associated with having a lack of morals (Bok, 1978).
When reviewing which variables had the greatest impact on intention to fake,
research supports that moral conviction is the best predictor (Sieler & Kuncel,
2005). This finding is consistent with McFarland and Ryan’s (2000) and Goffin and
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Boyd’s (2009) hypotheses that morals have influence on beliefs toward AFB. As
reviewed with the above anticipatory outcomes: while making a decision, people
use a mental weight-scale to balance the positives and the negatives as they try to
manage their working self-concept (i.e. the way people view and perceive
themselves) (Markus & Kunda, 1986). The costs attributed with a dishonest act win
out only if the perceived benefits are greater than the perceived risks (Allingham &
Sandmo, 1972). People compare their actions to their internal norms and values as
they construct and mold the cognitive schema of their moral identity (Aquino,
Freeman, Reed, Vivien, & Felps, 2009). Self-identity outcomes is proposed to
measure the extent an individual feels that their moral identity would change if they
participated in the behavior of interest
The last exogenous variable in this model is habit: “goal-directed automatic
behaviors that are mentally represented” (Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 2000). Habits are
developed based on past behavior and its propensity of automatic triggering is
largely based on the frequency of which that behavior is performed. Higher
frequency leads to greater familiarity which encourages automatic processing.
There is research that suggests that habits do not directly influence behavior and
instead its influence occurs through intentions (e.g. Beck & Ajzen, 1991; Trafimow
2000). However, Limayem, Hirt, and Cheung (2007) indicate weaknesses of these
studies, including a lack of sound theoretical evidence and imprecise operating
models. Many studies have supported the direct relationship between habit and
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behavior including research on blood donations (Mittal, 1988) and food
consumption (Tuorila and Pangborn, 1988).
Habits may also influence behavior via attitude toward behavior through
self-perception mechanisms (Eagly and Chaiken, 1993). For example, an individual
could perceive their habit of frequently playing with their dog after work as an
indicator that they like playing with their dog. As it applies to this study, an
individual could perceive their habit of frequently deceiving to increase their
likelihood of achieving a positive outcome as an indicator that they have a positive
attitude toward deceiving. Additionally, habits impact behaviors automatically.
Faking research theorizes a faking response type called reactive responding
(Griffith et al. 2011). Although reactive responders may recognize the potential to
fake, however, they may not have a coherent strategy for faking. Griffith et al.
(2011) suggest that this response type may account for the idiosyncratic item
response patterns found in Kuncel and Borneman (2007) and is similar to
reflection-impulsivity proposed by Kagan (1965). They propose that this type of
responder “endorse[s] items based on the perceived desirability of the item, without
regard to self or ideal-applicant schema.” They also suggest that this may lead to
“clumsy” responding. Based on the automatic processes that lead habits to
influence behavior, I propose that reactive responder could be successful if their
responses are the outcome of their past deceptive behavior. Although they may not
have a clear strategy going into the survey, now that the opportunity to deceive has
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presented itself, individuals with high habit of deceiving will reactively respond to
the items deceptively.
A positive attitude toward a behavior does not always lead to action. In
most scenarios, intentions must be formed prior to the behavior. The more positive
the attitudes toward a behavior are, the greater the intentions to act will be. There
has been widespread support for intentions as the primary antecedent to behavior
(Armitrage & Conner, 2001; Webb & Sheeran, 2006). Much research,
unsurprisingly, has found that individuals act impulsively or spontaneously
(Bagozzi, Yi, Baumgartner, 1990) without intention. However, an individual’s
intentions may be lower if the individual does not perceive that there are enough
resources or ability to execute the behavior. In Bagozzi et al. (1990) research
participants did not form strong intentions for their behavior because they did not
have motivation or opportunity. Spontaneous behavior is the result of a lack of
formulated intentions. When intentions are vague or non-existent, behavior may be
directly influenced by attitude toward the behavior. Fakers are no different in that
they can be spontaneous or impulsive. Griffith et al. (2011) suggested that
impulsivity is an individual difference that would likely yield responding behavior
that was highly motivated but ineffective. A behavior requires, at minimum, a
formulation of an attitude toward the behavior. And unlike TPB, Eagly and
Chaiken’s model suggests behavior may not require intention.
Eagly and Chaiken’s (1993) model combines many attitude theories for a
more inclusive representation of the interaction between attitudes and important
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psychosocial factors. Additionally, this model includes variables and hypothesized
relationships that may provide better prediction for behaviors that require more
than just volition (i.e. opportunity, skill, resources). For these reasons, this model is
argued to better predict AFB in comparison to other theories, including the TPB.
To better understand why this model may be a better predictor of AFB, I will first
review the existing AFB literature that integrates attitude theory.
Attitude Theory in Applicant Faking Behavior Literature
Applicant faking behavior research is increasingly incorporating theory,
however, there are still only a few studies that have incorporated attitude theory.
Where McFarland and Ryan (2006) were the first to empirically test the TPB as it
applies to AFB, Grieve and McSwiggin (2014) expanded on this model with the
inclusion of the predictor variable, moral obligation norms.
McFarland and Ryan (2006) tested the integration of TPB with AFB in a
two part study. In study one, they hypothesized that attitudes toward AFB,
subjective norms, and perceived behavioral control would correlate with intention
to fake. The procedure used a cross-sectional approach asking all participants to
complete the surveys within an hour long survey battery. The researchers found
significant relationships for intention to fake with all three variables: attitudes
toward AFB (r = .64), subjective norms toward AFB (r = .44), and perceived
behavioral control (PBC) toward AFB (r = .47). These three variables explained
45% of the variance in the intention to fake with attitude toward AFB explaining
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the most variance, followed by PBC. This was the first empirical study to provide
support for TPB as a predictor of intention to fake.
Although study 1 was an important and novel finding, study 2 aimed to
make up for its limitations by restricting the susceptibility to common method bias
and incorporating AFB in addition to the intention to fake. Study two asked
participants to take the personality measure in an honest condition and a condition
where they were asked to take the survey as if applying for a real job. All of the
predictor variables were administered at least one week in advance. Applicant
faking behavior was measured using a social desirability measure and by
subtracting the score received in the honest condition from the score received in the
applicant condition. Study 2 found that that attitude toward AFB, PBC, and
subjective norms were significant predictors of intention to fake, explaining a
combined 57% of the variance. Both measures of AFB were related to intentions to
fake. Additional path analysis indicated the integration of TPB has good fit. This
analysis did not support subjective norm as a significant predictor of intention to
fake.
Study two was an improvement from study one in regards to its limitations;
however, it is not without limitations of its own. Mainly, study two was conducted
in a lab and therefore may not be generalizable to real-life applicant scenario
effects. McFarland and Ryan did conduct statistical comparison to real life
applicant responding and found it comparable. Even with this support, real job
applicant data would add to their support found for TPB in this study.
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Mueller-Hanson et al. (2006) combined research from Snell et al. (1999)
and McFarland and Ryan (2000; 2006) to develop a new model of AFB. Similar to
McFarland and Ryan’s (2006) findings, they found support for the integration of
TPB with AFB. Mueller-Hanson et al. combined PBC, perceived subjective norms,
and perceived importance of AFB (in replace of attitudes toward AFB) to create a
single antecedent to intentions to fake, called perceptions of the situation. Applicant
faking behavior was operationalized as the difference score between an honest
condition and a simulated applicant condition, where participants were asked to
pretend they are applying for their dream job. Using structural equation modeling,
they found significant path coefficient between perceptions of the situation and
intentions to fake (.99, p < .01). Findings also supported McFarland and Ryan
(2006) with a significant path coefficient (.7, p < .01) between intentions to fake
and AFB. Also significantly related to intentions to fake were conscientiousness
and emotional stability. These findings demonstrate that intentions to fake is driven
by a complex set of attitudes and personal characteristics. With the strongest
support coming from perceptions of the situation and intentions to fake, this study
supports McFarland and Ryan’s (2006) suggestion that there is potential value in
manipulating perceptions and intentions to decrease AFB prior to non-cognitive
measurement in the application process.
The findings suggest that AFB is, at least partially, a conscious and preplanned attempt to present oneself in a favorable light within the application
process. This study, however, did not test whether any of the variables directly
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impact AFB. There is significant AFB research that would suggest that this
relationship may exist because some fakers are more spontaneous in their AFB
(Griffith et al. 2011). Such relationships within attitude centric AFB models remain
untested. Another weakness of Mueller-Hanson et al. (2007) was the lab setting
with student participants. This may inaccurately portray the real-life applicant
scenario. This is a weakness found throughout existing AFB research and is
addressed in his dissertation.
Research conducted by Grieve and McSwiggan (2014) extends the
conversation started by McFarland and Ryan (2006) by expanding the application
of TPB in AFB research. Grieve and McSwiggan tested moral obligation norm, or
morality, as an additional factor to predict intention to fake. Morality has been
proposed theoretically as a valuable predictor of intention to fake (Goffin & Boyd,
2009; McFarland and Ryan, 2000; Snell et al., 1999). Grieve (2012) was one of the
first to test it empirically, using honest-humility as a proxy, and found support for it
as a significant predictor of AFB over and above personality variables. Upon the
inclusion of other variables (e.g. psychopathy), however, the prediction value was
insignificant. Questioning honesty-humility as a sufficient proxy for morality,
Grieve and McSwiggan hypothesized that moral obligation norm concerning AFB
and ethical position (idealistic and relativistic) would significantly predict AFB.
Moral obligation norm has been found to significantly predict value-laden
behaviors over and above TPB variables (Connor & Armitage, 1998). We would
expect a low moral obligation to avoid faking to be related to greater faking.
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Ethical Position is conceptualized as an individual’s moral orientation that
influences decision making based on what’s right and wrong (Schlenker, 2008).
Ethical position consists of ethical idealism and ethical relativism. High idealism is
the belief that there are universal ethical rules that should be followed in all
situations (e.g. “Thou shall not lie”) whereas high relativism considers the decision
relative to the context (e.g. “Thou shall not lie, unless it’s subjectively beneficial to
do so”). In the context of AFB, individuals high in idealism would be less likely to
fake because they would consider that lying should never be acceptable, even if
they knew they would not get caught and it would give them a better chance to get
the job. High relativists, on the other hand, may more deeply consider the context
and allow that to influence their morally based decision making. Grieve and
McSwiggan conceptualize and analyze these constructs as mutually exclusive. It
should be noted, however, that these constructs were originally proposed in a fourfold classification matrix consisting of Situationalists (high idealism, high
relativism), Absolutionists (high idealism, low relativism), Subjectivists (low
idealism, high relativism), and Exceptionalists (low idealism, low relativism).
Grieve and McSwiggan’s research did not incorporate this classification scheme.
Using a cross-sectional approach Grieve and McSwiggan used hierarchal
multiple regression to find that the combination of attitude, perceived behavioral
control and subjective norm accounted for 52% of the variability in intention to
fake. Attitude and perceived behavioral control were significant predictors of
intention to fake, however, subjective norm was not. The weak support for
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subjective norms’ lack of predictive value is consistent with past research in
regards to dishonest behavior, including cheating, shoplifting, lying (Beck &
Ajzen, 1991), and AFB (McFarland & Ryan, 2006). In step 2, moral obligation
accounted for an addition 12% of variability and was a significant individual
predictor of intention to fake. This support is consistent with past findings for
morals on value-laden behaviors (Beck & Ajzen, 1991; Nemme & White, 2010).
Idealistic and relativistic ethical positioning did not add incremental validity in Step
3, as neither were significant predictors of intention to fake. As hypothesized, at the
bivariate level, ethical idealism was significantly negatively correlated with
intention to fake. However, ethical relativism was not significantly correlated. The
entire model explained 66% of variance, R=.82, R2=.67, F (6, 211) = 70.89, p=.001,
(adjusted R2 = .659). Grieve and McSwiggan’s research provide further support for
the use of TPB in AFB theory. They established empirical support for a measure of
morality as a predictor of intention to fake. Although ethical idealism and
relativism did not account for significant variability in attention to fake above and
beyond TPB variables, a significant individual correlation did exist for ethical
idealism on intention to fake. This research provides support for TPB and partial
support for morality, however, like studies before it, uses a lab-based methodology.
As previously reviewed, the anticipatory outcomes outlined in the AttitudeBehavior model (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993) are predicted to operate by expectancyvalue frameworks (Vroom, 1964). This framework is most recently applied from
Ellingson and McFarland’s (2011) proposed VIE theory. VIE theory argues that
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applicants behavior is determined based on three proximal factors: valence,
instrumentality, and expectancy. From a faker’s perspective, valence is the belief
that AFB yields desirable outcomes including those that come with a new job.
Instrumentality is the belief that AFB is required to score well on the measure and
that scoring well will result in winning the job opportunity. Lastly, expectancy is
the belief that the applicant can fake successfully and therefore, can increase their
scores. These components most closely with align with utilitarian outcomes from
this dissertation. Ellingson & McFarland’s research called for empirical research to
support their theory and examining utilitarian outcomes may be a valuable initial
exploration to warrant continued research in VIE.
The AFB research has largely supported TPB prediction value for AFB.
However, the amount of research in this area remains minimal. Further research is
needed to fully understand the relationships between the variable make-up of TPB
and AFB. Additionally, research that examines this relationship in a real applicant
setting will provide additional validity to our understanding of the relationship.
Method Overview
To test the below hypotheses, a two phase methodology was used to collect
within-subjects data. In phase 1, the motivated condition, participants applying to a
large retail organization completed an application that includes a 20-item
Summated Conscientiousness Scale (SCS); adapted from the Customer Service
Conscientiousness Scale utilized by Peterson et al., 2009. Upon completion of the
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application process, participants were asked to volunteer for an independent
research study.
Those who volunteered participated in phase 2, the research condition. Four
to eight weeks after the completion of their application, participants received a link
the research condition’s measures through email. The non-motivated condition’s
measures included the SCS from phase 1, as well all additional measures used in
this study. Participants were instructed to answer as honestly as possible. The
scores from the SCS on phase 1 and 2 were used to determine the extent of within
person faking. For a detailed review of the procedure, see the Method section
below.
Hypotheses Overview
This dissertation expands on past integrations of attitude and AFB theory
with a focus on Eagly and Chaiken’s (1991) composite model of the attitudebehavior relationship. Below I summarize the hypotheses associated with Figure 1.
Habit
Habits are defined as behaviors that are mostly automatic and do not require
much conscious thought to activate. Habits have been shown to both directly and
indirectly impact behavior (Ouellette & Wood, 1998). Habits of deception have the
potential to impact AFB indirectly via attitudes toward AFB through selfperception mechanisms. Applicants who have a history of consistently being
deceptive will more positively evaluate AFB on a selection measure.
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Hypothesis 1a: Habit of deception will positively predict attitude
toward AFB such that the greater the habit of deception, the more
positive the attitude toward AFB.
Habit has been demonstrated as directly impactful on behavior that is
relatively less volitional. There is support that aspects of AFB are less volitional
and more automatic. AFB research has supported a type of faker that is more
spontaneous or impulsive and demonstrate “reactive” response patterns (Griffith et
al., 2011). A reactive responder may potentially be acting in response to their
established habit for deceiving. Applicants low in integrity would not feel pressure
to be honest in a situation like AFB (Goffin and Boyd, 2009) which may remove
hesitation to act in accordance with past deceptive behaviors. Unlike, Griffith et
al.’s (2011) suggestion that reactive responding would be unsuccessful at faking,
this study suggests that an individual with an established habit for deceiving would
respond reactively but also successfully.
The act of being deceptive is common and the constant practice of it results
in automatic manifestation (Smith, 2004). Habit has widespread support for its
direct influence on behavior (Ouellette & Wood, 1998).
Hypothesis 1b: Habit of deception will demonstrate a statistically
significant positive relationship with AFB such that the greater the
habit of deception, the greater the AFB.
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Attitude toward Personality Measures for Selection
Eagly and Chaiken (1993) define attitude toward targets as evaluations of
targets of behavior. Ekman (1992) defined deception as “a deliberate choice to
mislead a target without giving any notification of the intent to do so.” When an
individual interacts with an attitude object, that individual automatically accesses
evaluations toward the attitude target (Fazio, 1995). It is not only important to
consider the attitude toward the act of deception, we need to observe the attitude
toward the target that is being deceived. An attitude toward a target does not have
direct influence on behavior, it may influence behavior via multiple mediators
including attitude toward behavior.
In the AFB scenario, an applicant’s target is the personality measure. As
many as 74% of applicants believe that other applicants use deception on
personality measures (English et al., 2005). Crittenden, Hanna, and Peterson (2009)
explain that a major reason why people cheat is due to the perception that many
others are doing it. This was supported from Graham et al (1994) whose research
demonstrates that college students who thought a large number of students cheat
were more likely to have cheated themselves. Within the AFB literature, Snell
(1999) concluded that perceptual factors, notably the perceived frequency which
other’s fake, is a key motivational factor for AFB. It is suggested that less
favorable views of personality measures, such as the belief that most people fake
on them, is related to more favorable attitude toward AFB.
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Hypothesis 2: Attitude toward applicant personality measures will
negatively predict attitude toward AFB such that the more favorable
the attitude toward personality measures, the more unfavorable the
attitude toward AFB.
Anticipatory Outcomes
Utilitarian outcomes are the rewards and punishments that are anticipated to
result from the behavior. In Theory of Planned behavior, utilitarian outcomes make
up the perceived behavioral outcomes. Utilitarian outcomes have been supported
correlating with attitudes of behavior (e.g. Guo, Xiao, & Tang, 2009). In the faking
scenario, applicants will weigh the likelihood that AFB will be successful (or go
unpunished) and the value of increasing their chances to be selected. Faking
research has shown the ability to influence this internal “weighing” through
warnings (Dwight & Donovan, 2003) and using verifiable items related to
applicants’ experiences (Klein & Owens, 1965).
Utilitarian outcomes are most similar to the components of VIE theory
(Ellingson & McFarland, 2011). Expectancy theory (Vroom, 1964) suggests the
more an individual perceives participating in a behavior will lead to positive
outcomes, the more that individual will be motivated to behave. Utilitarian
outcomes are expected to influence an individual’s attitude toward AFB.
Hypothesis 3: Utilitarian outcomes of AFB will positively predict
attitude toward AFB such that the more positive the perception of
utilitarian outcomes, the more positive the attitude toward AFB.
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The second anticipatory outcomes is normative outcomes: the expected
approval or disapproval of significant others in relation to the behavior of interest.
Research supports that when individuals perceive that significant others would
approve of a behavior, that individual is more likely to engage in that behavior
(Ajzen, 1991). Although highly supported in attitude research, the interaction
between normative outcomes and attitude toward behavior has not been explored in
AFB research.
Hypothesis 4a: Normative outcomes of AFB will positively predict
attitude toward AFB such that the more positive the perception of
normative outcomes, the more positive the attitude toward AFB.
This second hypothesis regarding social norms has been well supported in
both attitude and AFB literature (Ajzen, 1991; McFarland & Ryan, 2006).
Hypothesis 4b: Normative outcomes of AFB will demonstrate a
statistically significant positive relationship with intention to fake
such that the more positive the perception of normative outcomes,
the greater the intention to fake.
Idealistic Ethical Position
The final exogenous variable, and last of the three anticipatory outcomes
suggested by Eagly and Chaiken’s attitude-behavior model, is self-identity
outcomes. Ethical positioning can be used to understand the likelihood an
individual may consider behaving based on their moral self-concept and can be
used as a measure of an individual’s self-identity outcomes (Solinger et al., 2008).
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An individual who determines their actions based on a strict, no deception ethical
code is less likely to fake than an applicant who believes that ethics and morals can
and should be malleable based on the situation. Therefore, it is suggested that
individuals with an idealist self-concept will be more likely to have negative
perceptions of faking and have lower intentions to do so if they are more of an
idealist than a realist. To this point, ethical positioning has only been tested by
Grieve and McSwiggan (2014) and found inconsistent support.
Hypothesis 5a: Idealistic ethical position will negatively predict
attitude toward AFB such that the greater the idealistic position, the
more unfavorable the attitude toward AFB.
Hypothesis 5b: Ethical positioning will demonstrate a statistically
significant negative relationship with intention to fake such that the
greater the idealistic positioning, the lower the intention to fake.
Attitude toward Applicant Faking Behavior
Attitude toward behavior relationship with the intention to behave has been
well supported for decades (Ajzen & Fishbein, 2005). This relationship has also
been well supported in AFB research (Grieve & McSwiggan, 2014; McFarland &
Ryan, 2000; McFarland and Ryan, 2006; Mueller-Hanson, Heggestad, Thornton,
2006).
Hypothesis 6a: Attitude toward AFB will positively predict
intention to fake such that the more favorable the attitude toward
AFB, the greater the intention to fake.
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As previously reviewed from the Bagozzi and Yi (1989), it is not
uncommon that individuals will act more spontaneously and without intention
because they lack the motivation, resources, or opportunity. We have also seen
from Griffith et al. (2011) that fakers may act similarly. In this scenario, Eagly &
Chaiken (1993) suggest that an attitude toward behavior can directly impact the
behavior and can bypass the intention to behave.
Hypothesis 6b: Attitude toward AFB will demonstrate a statistically
significant positive relationship with AFB such that the more
favorable the attitude toward AFB, the greater the AFB.
Intention to Fake
Intention to behave has been well-supported as the primary determinant of
behavior (Ajzen & Fishbein, 2005). This relationship has also been well supported
in AFB research (Grieve & McSwiggan, 2014; McFarland & Ryan, 2001;
McFarland & Ryan, 2006; Mueller-Hanson et al., 2006).
Hypothesis 7: Intention to fake will positively predict AFB such that
the greater the intention to fake, the greater the AFB.
Method
Participants
This study analyzed data collected from a larger research effort conducted
by the Applicant Response Behavior (ARB) research team at the Florida Institute
of Technology. The data set from this larger research effort consisted of
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participants who were job applicants of a large United States retail organization.
The applicants were applying for various positions (i.e. customer service, sales,
service technician, warehouse, and clerical/administrative). The applicants
completed an online battery of assessments administered by a third-party selection
consulting firm that provides solutions for personnel selection. The ARB research
team worked with the consulting firm and their client retail organization to develop
two-phase research approach (see Procedures below for details). Upon completion
of the online battery, applicants were asked if they are interested in volunteering to
participate in an independent research study. The consulting firm provided the
research study data for those applicants who agreed to participate in the research
study.
In total, 7,740 applicants indicated that they were willing to participate in
the independent research study at a later date. This sample of individuals was
contacted by the researchers four to eight weeks after completing the initial online
battery and provided a link to complete a second set of assessments. Of the 7,740
applicant who agreed to participate, 419 (5.4%) completed the second set of
assessments.
To demonstrate that the final sample (N=419) did not respond significantly
different from the initial applicant group (N=7,740), we compared their Summated
Conscientiousness Scale (SCS) scores. The initial applicant group and the final
sample had similar means (110.37 and 111.88, respectively) and standard
deviations (8.81 and 8.09, respectively). However, an independent-samples t-test
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suggested that mean SCS scores from the two groups were significantly different,
t(7738) = 1.00, p = .000. Although the d-effect size (.17) suggests minimal
differences between the groups, the results of the t-test and low response rate are
discussed as limitations in the Discussion section.
Among the 419 responses, 46 were screened out of the database due to: (1)
failure to pass an attention assessing manipulation check, (2) providing formulaic
response patterns, or (3) being an outlier on any measure. The final sample
consisted of 373 participants with ages ranging from 18 to 77 and a mean of 34.98.
The participants consisted of 53.5% (N=191) male, 44.5% (N=159) female, and
2.0% (N=7) not specified. The ethnicity of the participants included 59.1% (N =
211) White/Caucasian, 20.2% (N = 72) Black/African American, 7.8% (N = 28)
Latino(a)/Hispanic, 7.6% (N = 36) other, and 5.3% (N = 19) not specified. As an
indication of this sample having high job search experience, 91.1% had applied to
at least on other job in the prior two months with 44.1% having applied to 11 or
more.
Procedures
To test this study’s hypotheses, the methodology used by Griffith et al.
(2007) was implemented. In phase 1, the motivated condition, participants
completed an assessment battery that included the Summated Conscientiousness
Scale (SCS). Upon completion of the application process, participants were asked
to volunteer for an independent study conducted by a research team at Florida
Institute of Technology. These applicants were incentivized to volunteer with an
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entry into a raffle for one of several cash prizes up to a $1000 grand prize. If
applicants agreed to participate, they were asked to provide their first and last
names, as well as the email address at which they were contacted by the researchers
for phase 2. The names, emails, and SCS data was provided to the research team by
the consulting firm for only those individuals who agreed to participate in phase 2.
Phase 2, the non-motivated condition, was implemented four to eight weeks
following phase 1 to minimize practice effects. Participants were emailed a link to a
new battery of items, including the SCS items which were scattered among the
battery to disguise that this was the same measure from Phase 1. After consenting
to take part in the study, participants were taken to a webpage which presented
specific instructions to respond honestly to all assessment items. After completing
the personality inventory, participants were asked to provide basic demographic
information such as age, gender, ethnic background, and work experience.
This two phased, within-subjects data, has be described as the “gold
standard” (Ryan & Boyce, 2006). This design permits observation of individual
differences in responding to personality measures in motivated and unmotivated
scenarios. This design does not require measurement of social desirability as a
proxy for AFB; a method which has been demonstrated as ineffective (Peterson et
al., 2011).
Measures
Applicant Faking Behavior. Applicant faking behavior (AFB) was
operationalized as a change score between the participants’ SCS scores in the
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applicant condition (Phase 1), and their scores under instructions to respond
honestly (Phase 2). Specifically, each participant’s honest score was subtracted
from their applicant score for each personality construct to obtain a continuous
measure that represented “the amount of faking”. This procedure has been widely
used (Ellingson et al., 2007; McFarland & Ryan, 2000, 2006; Mueller-Hanson et
al., 2003) and served as a means of creating a continuous variable to be used in the
analyses.
Attitude toward AFB. This measure was used in Mcfarland & Ryan
(2000) where it was reported with an internal reliability of .86. It is a five item
survey with a 5-point semantic-differential-type response scales including, goodbad, pleasant-unpleasant, foolish-wise, useful-useless, and unattractive-attractive in
response to the statement, “Use the following scales to describe your views of
applicant faking behavior.”
Attitudes toward Target. This measure from Rogelberg et al. (2001), who
reported a reliability of .9, was slightly modified to update the target to be
personality measures. This measure consists of nine items and uses a 5-point Likert
scale ranging 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). A sample item is,
“applicant personality measures are useful ways to gather information.”
Conscientiousness. The SCS is the scale used to measure conscientiousness
by Peterson et al. (2009). It is comprised of twenty items and uses a 5-point Likert
scale ranging 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Peterson et al. (2007)
reported an internal consistency reliability of .91.
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Idealistic Ethical Position. Forsyth’s (1980) Idealistic Ethics Position
Questionnaire consists of 10 items. The response scale is a 5-point Likert scale
ranging 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Internal reliabilities are good,
with Cronbach’s α of .88 for ethical idealism. A sample item is, “if an action could
harm an innocent other, then it should not be done.”
Intention to Fake. Intention to fake was used in Grieves and McSwiggan
(2014) where it demonstrated good internal reliability with Cronbach’s α of .88. It
is comprised of three items and uses a 5-point Likert scale ranging 1 (strongly
disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). A sample item includes, “I intend to fake on future
applicant personality measures.”
Self-Report Habit Index. The Self-Report Habit Index (Verplanken &
Orbell, 2003) has been altered to measure habit of deception. It consists of twelve
items and a 5-point Likert scale ranging 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree).
Internal reliabilities are good, with Cronbach’s α ranging from .89 to .91
(Verplanken & Orbell, 2003). A sample item is, “being deceptive is something I do
frequently.”
Subjective Norm of AFB. The subjective norm for faking behavior was
used in McFarland & Ryan (2000). It is a five item survey with a 5-point Likert
scale ranging 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). A sample item includes,
“Most other applicants fake on the applicant personality measures.”
Utilitarian Outcomes of AFB. This measure consists of three items with a
5-point Likert scale ranging 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Sample
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item includes, “I believe that faking on an applicant personality measure will yield
good results for me.” It has been adapted for faking from other studies including
Eagly and Chaiken (1993).
Analyses
Descriptive statistics were analyzed for all variables including means and
standard deviations. In addition, all study scales were examined for internal
consistency utilizing Cronbach’s alpha and all study variables were analyzed to
detect bivariate correlations.
Data relating to the study hypothesis were tested using structural equation
modeling (SEM) using IBM SPSS AMOS Version 24. Path analysis was used to
assess all hypotheses simultaneously. Assumptions for SEM were met and
Maximum Likelihood estimation was applicable.
The model tested (Figure 2) consists of one outcome variable (AFB) and 7
other latent variables including 5 exogenous (habit of deception, attitude toward
applicant personality measures, utilitarian outcomes of AFB, Normative outcomes
of AFB, and Ethical Positioning) and 3 endogenous variables (Attitude Toward
AFB, Intention to Fake, and AFB). When modeling indicators, a choice can be
made to use single item indicators, or indicators comprised of several individual
items. These multi-item indicators are often referred to as item parcels, and may be
more reliable than single item indicators (Hall, Snell, & Foust, 1999). Due to a
lower number of items, the following latent variables in the current study were
modeled with indicators consisting of single items: Normative Outcomes of AFB
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(five indicators), Utilitarian Outcomes of AFB (three indicators), Attitude toward
AFB (five indicators), and Intention to Fake (three indicators). Given a larger
number of items, the following constructs have indicators consisting of item
parcels: Attitude toward Applicant Personality Measures, Ethical Position, and
Self-Report Habit Index. All items were randomly assigned into parcels. Random
assignment method is supported by past research (e.g. Hall et al., 1999).
First, a CFA was conducted to assess the measurement model fit and
observed variable factor loadings. Goodness of fit was evaluated using the
following indices and thresholds as defined by Hu and Bentler (1999): Goodness of
Fit (GFI > .95), Adjusted Goodness of Fit (AGFI > .80), Comparative Fit Index
(CFI > .90), Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (SRMS < .09), and Root
Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA <.05). Following the CFA, the
structural model was assessed for good fit.

Results
Preliminary Analyses
The data was cleaned and screened. There were no missing data because all
items were required. First, 41 cases were removed for failure to pass the
manipulation check. Second, three cases were removed for acquiescent responding
which were flagged for any participant who used the same Likert point for more
than 90% of their responses. Lastly, to examine outliers, raw scores for all
measures were converted into z-scores. A case was assessed for removal if any z63

score was greater than 3.29 or less than -3.29 (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). In all,
46 cases were removed, resulting in a final sample size of 373.
Next, scale level outliers were assessed, and an assessment of normality was
conducted. Analysis indicated significant kurtosis values (above 2.00 or below 2.00) for 39 of the 87 items and skewness for 19 of the 87 items (George &
Mallery, 2010). Upon further examination, few extreme instances of skewness and
kurtosis were observed. It is not uncommon to find non-normal data in social
sciences (Bentler & Chou, 1987) and structural equation modelling is relatively
robust to violations of normality (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Nevertheless, parcel
development may partially resolve non-normality as items that are aggregated or
averaged often reduce the extreme influence of any one item. Parcels were created
for the following measures: Attitude toward Applicant Personality Measures,
Idealistic Ethical Positioning, and Habit of Deception. Each measure contained
three parcels consisting of randomly assigned items. This random assignment
method is supported by past research (e.g. Hall et al., 1999). Once the item parcels
were established, further examination revealed only two parcels remained with
significant kurtosis. Both parcels were indicators of Habit of Deception. We
retained this variable and watched it closely throughout all remaining analyses and
no additional concerns emerged. This limitation is discussed further in the
Limitations and Future Research section. The kurtosis and skewness values for all
items and parcels can be seen in Table 6.

64

Next, internal consistencies were assessed using Nunnally’s (1978)
recommendation for acceptable internal consistency of α > .70. All scales
demonstrated acceptable reliabilities. Next, descriptive statistics (means and
standard deviations) and correlations between all study variables were analyzed
(See Table 1).
Additionally, the percentage of fakers were calculated using the accepted
method described in Peterson et al. (2011). The
Following a review of the descriptive statistics and tests for assumptions,
the measurement model (See Figure 6) was developed in IBM SPSS AMOS
Version 24 to conduct the Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA). In this model and
in the models described below, we have seven latent variables indicated as ovals.
Additionally we chose to represent AFB as an observed variable rather than a latent
variable. This observed variable was calculated as the difference between the SCS
composite scores of Phase 1 and Phase 2. Therefore, in the models, AFB is
represented as a rectangle without indicator variables. Although not elaborated on
in this study, another model was assessed with AFB as a latent variable with
indicators as the different scores of the conscientious measures (See Figure 10).
Composite Reliability (CR), and Average Variance Extracted (AVE) were analyzed
to investigate convergent and discriminant validity (Fornell & Larcker, 1981).
Composite Reliability is a reliability estimator that is commonly calculated
during SEM analysis. Composite Reliability does not receive the criticisms that
coefficient alpha receives of being lower bound and underestimating. It should be
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noted, however, that although the meta-analyses conducted by Peterson and Kim
(2013) support the notion that CR may be a better estimator of reliability, the
practical difference between the two may be inconsequential. Nevertheless,
analysis revealed significant reliability for all measures as evidenced by each
measure’s CR exceeding .7 (Hair et al., 2010).
Convergent and discriminant validity were then assessed. In structural
equation modelling, convergent validity refers to the degree to which a latent
variable is well measured by its indicators and discriminant validity is the degree to
which measures of different latent variables are unrelated in a hypothesized model.
The Average Variance Extracted (AVE) is a strict measure of convergent validity.
The AVE for this model indicates there is established convergent validity (AVE >
.5; Hair et al., 2010) for all measures with the exception of Normative Outcomes
(AVE = .34). The lack of convergent validity for Normative Outcomes indicates
that the latent variable is not well explained by its observed indicators. This
limitation for the Normative Outcomes Measure and is discussed further in the
Limitations and Future Research section.
Discriminant validly is supported when the square root of the AVE for each
variable is greater than any of its inter-factor correlations (Hair et al., 2010). This
assessment indicated potentially insufficient discriminant validity between
Utilitarian Outcomes and Normative Outcomes. This insufficiency suggest that the
parent latent factor may be better explained by variables outside of its own
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observed indicators. This validity insufficiency is also discussed in the Limitations
and Future Research section. For variable validity statistics, see Table 2.
A typical research concern when using self-report measures is Common
Method Bias (CMB). A conservative Common Latent Factor (CLF) approach was
taken to measure CMB (Podsakoff et al., 2003). A CFA was estimated with and
without a CLF to determine if large differences exist among the standardized
regression weights between the competing models. Some differences greater than
.20 were observed among the standardized regression weights within the Normative
Outcomes and Utilitarian Outcomes measures. Although some evidence of CMB
exists, it is possible that some of the variance partialed by the CLF may be
substantive shared variance that is construct relevant. Therefore, the results
reported below are not common method bias corrected. However, a second model
was computed where the CLF was retained. This model is depicted in Figure 7 and
fit statistics can be found in Table 4.
Next I will summarize the model fit indices using thresholds
recommendations from Hu and Bentler (1999). The overall model fit was analyzed
utilizing Maximum Likelihood Estimation. Table 3 shows the results of the
goodness of fit indices. The Chi-squared value for fit was significant, χ2 (272) =
536.65, p <.001 suggesting a lack of fit between the hypothesized model and the
data set. The chi-squared test, however, is a statistically powerful test and sensitive
to large sample size and a large amount of parameters. For this reason, researchers
agree that the analysis of fit should be based on multiple indices (Byrne, 2001;
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Kline, 2005) including those examined in this study: Goodness of Fit Index (GFI),
Adjusted Goodness of Fit Index (AGFI), Comparative Fit Index (CFI),
Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR), and Root Mean Square Error of
Approximation (RMSEA). These indices are summarized below.
The GFI and AGFI are alternative measures of chi-square and therefore
measure the fit of the hypothesized model compared to the covariance matrix. A
value of 1.00 suggests perfect fit. The recommended values for fit are to exceed .90
and .8 respectively. Unlike GFI, AGFI corrects for the number of parameters to
avoid overfitting. However, both measures are affected by sample size. The GFI
(.90) and AGFI (.87) indicate good fit.
The CFI compares the fit of the hypothesized model to the null model and is
relatively insensitive to sample size compared to other fit statistics (Hu and Bentler,
1999). The recommended value for CFI is at least .95 and therefore suggests good
fit for the hypothesized model (CFI = .95). Values closer to 1 are considered to be
of better fit.
The SRMR is a measure of absolute fit with zero indicating perfect fit. This
measure is not biased by the number of parameters. The recommended value for
SRMR is less than .08, indicating the hypothesized model has good fit (SRMR =
.04).
The recommended value for RMSEA is less than .05. The scale ranges from
zero to one with smaller values indicating better fit. This index compares the
observed covariance matrix per degree of freedom with the hypothesized
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covariance matrix. The RMSEA, then, accounts for model complexity and is one of
the fit indices that is least biased by sample size (Marsh, Hau, & Wen, 2004). The
RMSEA (.05) for the hypothesized model indicates mediocre fit.
In summary, the pattern of results from all fit indices suggests an overall
good model fit.
Structural Model Analysis
The Structural model was developed in AMOS (See Figure 8). The
assessment of fit indicated good model fit: χ2 (279) = 563.16, p <.001; GFI = .90;
AGFI = .87; CFI = .95; SRMS = .04; RMSEA = .05 (see table 5). The variance
predicted of our dependent variables is similar to those in other studies (e.g.
McFarlan & Ryan, 2006). Our exogenous variables explained 28% of the variance
in Attitude Toward AFB; Normative outcomes, Attitudes toward AFB and Idealism
predicted 76% of the variance in Intention to Fake; and Habit, Intention to Fake,
and Attitude toward Faking predicted 16% of the variance in AFB. Indirect effects
are provided in Table 7).
Hypothesis Testing
IBM SPSS AMOS Version 24 was used for this analysis as well. The wellfitting structural model was used to evaluate all hypothesized relationship through
path analysis. We examined the causal paths in the analyzed structural model. In
the next section, I lay out each hypothesis and provide the summary of the
relationship’s magnitude, direction, and significance.
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H1a: Habit of Deception will positively predict Attitude toward AFB such that
the greater the Habit of Deception, the more positive the Attitude toward
AFB. Habit of Deception did not have a positive direct effect on Attitude toward
AFB (Standardized Coefficient = -.09, p = n.s).
H1b: Habit of Deception will demonstrate a statistically significant positive
relationship with AFB such that the greater the Habit of Deception, the
greater the AFB. Although trending in the right direction, Habit of Deception did
not have a positive direct effect on AFB (Standardized Coefficient = .04, p = n.s).
H2: Attitude toward Applicant Personality Measures will negatively predict
Attitude toward AFB such that the more favorable the Attitude toward
Personality Measures, the more unfavorable the Attitude toward AFB.
Attitude toward Applicant Personality Measures had a negative direct effect on
Attitude toward AFB (Standardized Coefficient = -.15, p < .05).
H3: Utilitarian Outcomes of AFB will positively predict Attitude toward AFB
such that the more positive the perception of Utilitarian Outcomes, the more
positive the Attitude toward AFB. Utilitarian Outcomes did not have a positive
direct effect on Attitude toward AFB (Standardized Coefficient = -.14, p = n.s).
H4a: Normative Outcomes of AFB will positively predict Attitude toward AFB
such that the more positive the perception of Normative Outcomes, the more
positive the Attitude toward AFB. Normative Outcomes had a positive direct
effect on Attitude toward AFB (Standardized Coefficient = .43, p < .05).
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H4b: Normative Outcomes of AFB will demonstrate a statistically significant
positive relationship with Intention to Fake such that the more positive the
perception of Normative Outcomes, the greater the Intention to Fake.
Normative Outcomes had a positive direct effect on Intention to Fake (Standardized
Coefficient = .80, p < .05).
H5a: Idealistic Ethical Position will negatively predict Attitude toward AFB
such that the greater the Idealistic Position, the more unfavorable the Attitude
toward AFB. Although trending in the right direction, Idealistic Ethical Position
did not have a positive direct effect on Attitude toward AFB (Standardized
Coefficient = -.09, p = n.s.).
H5b: Idealistic Ethical position will demonstrate a statistically significant
negative relationship with Intention to Fake such that the greater the Idealistic
Position, the lower the Intention to Fake. Idealistic Ethical Position had a
negative direct effect on Attitude toward AFB (Standardized Coefficient = -.12, p <
.05).
H6a: Attitude toward AFB will positively predict Intention to Fake such that
the more favorable the Attitude toward AFB, the greater the Intention to
Fake. Attitude toward AFB did not have a positive direct effect on Intention to
Fake (Standardized Coefficient = -.04, p = n.s.).
H6b: Attitude toward AFB will demonstrate a statistically significant positive
relationship with AFB such that the more favorable the Attitude toward AFB,
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the greater the AFB. Attitude toward AFB had a positive direct effect on AFB
(Standardized Coefficient = .20, p < .05).
H7: Intention to Fake will positively predict AFB such that the greater the
Intention to Fake, the greater the AFB. Intention to Fake had a positive direct
effect on AFB (Standardized Coefficient = .44, p < .05).
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Discussion
Applicant faking behavior is a pervasive and vexing challenge for selection
professionals who utilize personality measures to make important business
decisions. To uncover the best methods for preventing, detecting, and managing
AFB, practitioners and researchers need to have a comprehensive understanding of
the nature of the phenomenon and the dynamics of its antecedents. Over the past
two decades, the field has seen substantial progress regarding theory development
and utilization of consistent rigorous methodologies to explore AFB. The intention
of this research is to continue the discussion by introducing a novel integration of
AFB and attitude theory, and to test that integration using “gold standard”
methodology. Specifically, this research used a two-phased within subjects design
to test the integration of modern faking theory with the Composite Model of the
Attitude–Behavior Relation (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993).
The results of this study provided valuable insights into the dynamics
between potential antecedents of applicant faking behavior. Three conclusions in
particular, will be most useful in guiding future research and practice: (1) Habit of
Deception, as currently measured, is not a viable direct or indirect antecedent of
AFB, (2) in addition to Attitude toward AFB, Attitude toward Personality Measures
should be included in the AFB story, and (3) Idealistic Ethical Position, as many
previously theorized, is a significant predictor of Intention to Fake. These key
findings, as well as all other hypotheses are discussed below.
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First, hypotheses 1a and 1b were unsupported such that habit of deception
was not a significant predictor of AFB or Attitude toward AFB. A common
criticism of the Theory of Planned Behavior was its omissions of key variables
including habits. Eagly and Chaiken (1993) added this variable in their expanded
model, the Composite Model of the Attitude–Behavior Relation. They proposed
that habits are a key driver of all attitudes and behaviors. In regard to habit’s impact
on behavior, researchers suggest that habits are developed from past behavior and
habit’s propensity to automatically trigger behaviors is mostly dependent on the
frequency of which that behavior has been performed. One likely reason for the
non-significant relationship in the current study is a lack of correspondence
between the predictor and outcome variables. Although AFB is considered a form
of deception, deception is a much broader term that can describe a multitude of
specific actions. In other words, even if we accurately measure a broad Habit of
Deception within in an individual, it may not be a strong predictor of the specific
act of AFB. Ideally, we would be able to measure one’s habit for faking personality
measures, however, this is unrealistic given that the opportunities to fake on a
personality measure are too few and far in between to establish firm habits around.
It should be noted, however, that Grieve (2012) observed that individuals who had
any past experience with personality measures had more intention to fake.
Therefore, past experience with personality measures should still continue to be
explored in future research. Lastly, an individual who often deceives, may not be
capable of faking, even if they have a high propensity to attempt faking. Faking is
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considered an ability, requiring a certain amount of skill and knowledge to be
successful (Snell et al., 1999). Habit then, may be a more appropriate direct
predictor of variables that that are less volitional and do not require ability to be
successful.
In instances where behaviors are not well learned or are performed in
unstable or difficult contexts, habits may influence behavior indirectly (Ouellette &
Wood, 1998). It was hypothesized that habits would influence attitude toward AFB
through self-perception mechanisms. Again, correspondence may be an issue here.
If an individual sees themselves as deceiving often, this doesn’t necessarily mean
they will have a more positive attitude toward AFB. Another potential reason for
the non-significant findings may be that people, in general, have poor selfawareness of the amount that they deceive, and this may have affected the
normality of the data and introduced a bias into the analyses. The habit of deception
measure was observed to have considerable skewness and kurtosis concerns. This
non-normality may have led to a lack of variance and a lower potential for
significant findings. The skewness and kurtosis analysis show that the respondents
in this survey do not believe they frequently deceive, nor is deception a part of who
they are. Research suggests that we think we are honest people who do not lie or
cheat as much as we actually do (Mazar, Amir, & Ariely, 2003). The primary
reason we convince ourselves of this is to maintain our moral self-concept. This is
another indication that people are not reliable at reflecting on their own automatic
actions (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). In sum, although this study could not find a
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statistically significant relationship for habits directly or indirectly impacting
faking, there is still potential for habits to be a viable driver of AFB, although it
may require different measurement techniques. Opportunities for continued
examination of Habit of deception is discussed further in the Limitations and
Future Research section.
Second, as predicted by hypotheses 2, Attitude toward Applicant
Personality Measures had a negative direct effect on Attitude toward AFB. This
supports the Composite Model of the Attitude–Behavior Relation and the
Automatic Processing Model (Fazio, 1986). An attitude toward a target is the
evaluation of an entity to which a particular behavior is directed (Eagly & Chaiken,
1993). In the current context, applicant personality measures were chosen as the
target to be measured. Our findings suggested that the more positively an individual
evaluated applicant personality measures, the more negatively they evaluated AFB.
Fazio suggests that an individual’s attitude toward target is highly accessible and
automatically activated. Therefore, when an individual is exposed to a personality
measure, their attitude toward personality measures is already triggered to influence
their attitude toward AFB on that measure. These findings support the notion that
there are varying opinions of personality measures and those opinions may
influence other key components involved in the prediction of AFB. This finding
has direct implications and emphasizes the importance of face-validity of
personality measures. Although personality measures have strong empirical
validity, they have long held relatively weak face validity (Hogan, Hogan, &
76

Roberts, 1996) which may lead to negative evaluations of personality measures.
These novel findings and the potential influence on research and practice are
detailed in the Practical Implications as well as the Limitations and Future
Research sections.
Third, hypothesis 3 was unsupported such that Utilitarian Outcomes did not
have a positive direct effect on Attitude toward AFB. This is one of the most
surprising non-significant findings. In this study, Utilitarian Outcomes are the
rewards and punishments that are anticipated to results from AFB. In this sample,
individuals who believed that AFB will lead to positive outcomes did not have a
more positive attitude toward AFB in comparison to those individuals who believed
that AFB would not lead to positive outcomes. This result is not supported in past
research (e.g. Guo, Xiao, & Tang, 2009; Vroom, 1964). Although utilitarian
outcomes has not been utilized in faking research, these results are unsupported in
the faking literature with similar constructs such as perceived behavioral control
and instrumentality (Ellingson & McFarland, 2011; Marcus, 2009; McFarland &
Ryan, 2006; Mueller-Hanson et al., 2006). Utilitarian outcomes is assessed using an
expectancy x value paradigm (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993), similar to these constructs.
The potential validity concerns may be the reason behind the non-significant result
and is discussed further in the Limitations and Future Research section.
Fourth, as predicted by hypotheses 4a and 4b, Normative Outcomes had a
positive direct effect on Attitude toward AFB and Intention to Fake. These findings
are consistent with those hypothesized in the Composite Model of the Attitude–
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Behavior Relation. In this study, normative outcomes are the perceived approval or
disapproval of significant others as it pertains to faking on a personality test.
Extensive research utilizing the TPB model suggests that when individuals perceive
that significant others would approve of a behavior, that individual is more likely to
engage in the target behavior (Ajzen, 1991). Across TPB research, the direct effects
of normative outcomes typically have relatively low magnitudes, particularly when
the behavior of interest is dishonest (Beck & Ajzen, 1991). Within the faking
literature, to my knowledge, this is the second empirical study to find a significant
relationship between normative outcomes and intention to fake. This finding further
supports the application of TPB to AFB modelling. This study’s findings regarding
normative outcomes should be interpreted with caution due to validity concerns
which are discussed in more detail in the Limitations and Future Research section.
Fifth, hypothesis 5a was unsupported such that Idealistic Ethical Position
was not a negative predictor of Attitude toward AFB. However, as predicted by
hypothesis 5b, Idealistic Ethical Position had a significant negative relationship
with Intention to Fake. These results partially support the Composite Model for
Attitude-Behavior Relations. An individual characterized by high idealism
determines their actions using the guideline that there are universal ethical rules
that should be followed in all situations (including taking personality measures).
The results of hypothesis 5a suggest that the extent to which an individual is
unwilling to waver from their ethical code is unrelated to attitudes toward AFB.
Hypothesis 5b suggests, however, that the extent to which an individual is
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unwilling to waver from their ethical code is related to their intention to fake. These
results support Grieve and McSwiggan’s (2014) and Sieler and Kuncel’s (2005)
faking related results. Since the early stages of AFB literature, there has been a call
for the inclusion of morality or moral code in the study of AFB (Goffin & Boyd,
2009; McFarland and Ryan, 2000; Snell et al., 1999) because of its close relation to
deception in western culture (Bok, 1978). Now, the inclusion of idealism or an
ethical code related variable has gained considerable support in a number of
different survey designs, measures, and analyses (e.g., Grieve, 2012; Grieve &
McSwiggan, 2014; Sieler & Kuncel, 2005)
Sixth, hypothesis 6a was unsupported, such that Attitude toward AFB did
not positively predict Intention to Fake. Respondents in this study with more
positive evaluations of AFB were no more likely to intend to fake than were
individuals who had more negative evaluations of AFB. This was one of the most
surprising results of this study. Attitude toward behavior as a predictor of intention
to behave is a well-supported relationship in attitude (Ajzen, 1991) and faking
research (McFarland & Ryan, 2006; McFarland & Ryan, 2006; Mueller-Hanson,
Heggestad, Thornton, 2006).
Unlike 6a, 6b was supported. Attitude toward AFB demonstrated a
significant positive relationship with AFB. This supports the Composite Model of
Attitude-Behavior Relation. However, this relationship is unique to AFB literature
and traditional TPB literature. Past attitude research has demonstrated that attitudes
are better predictors of behaviors when that attitude is held with relatively greater
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certainty. In other words, decisive attitudes predict behavior better than weak or
inconsistent ones (Borgida & Campbell, 1982; Kraus, 1995). Additionally, attitudebehavior relationships are stronger when they are correspondent (Ajzen & Fishbein,
1977), and when there is no expectation to discuss their attitudes with others
(Leippe & Elkin, 1987). Lastly, the attitude-behavior relationship has been shown
to be stronger when attitudes are formed when there was greater motivation to think
about the attitude target (Glassman & Albarracin, 2006). In the context of this
study, although the concept of faking may be new to many respondents, deception
is not. Firstly, participant’s attitudes about deception is probably relatively stable,
especially at our sample’s mean age of 35. Secondly, the correspondence in this
research between attitude toward faking and AFB is high. Thirdly, there is no
expectation that one would need to or have had shared their attitude toward faking
with others. And lastly, as evidenced by the results of hypothesis 2, attitude target
is a salient factor that has influence on attitudes toward AFB. This evidence
provides support for the findings in this study and demonstrates the value of
retaining the attitude toward AFB – AFB relationship in future research.
Lastly, and unsurprisingly, hypothesis 7 correctly predicted that intention to
fake had a positive direct effect on AFB. This relationship has garnered extensive
support from AFB (e.g. McFarland & Ryan, 2006) and attitude research (Ajzen,
1991). Although faking does require a level of skill to be successful, research has
clearly demonstrated that individuals who intend to fake are more likely to
successfully fake than those who do not intend to fake.
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Practical Implications
Although the primary intent of this study was to test integrated theory, the
generalizability of the findings is relatively strong compared to other AFB research
because few AFB studies have utilized real applicant data.
This study’s findings suggest that applicants may be impacted by their
evaluations of personality measures such that applicants who evaluate personality
measures more favorably are less likely to fake than those who evaluate personality
measures more negatively. As organizations continue to monitor and improve their
personality measures’ reliability and validity for selection, they should also
consider and make efforts to improve face validity more carefully. Additionally,
selection measure proctors may educate applicants on the validity of personality
measures prior to administration. These methods may increase the favorable
evaluations of personality measures among applicants and therefore decrease
negative applicant attitudes toward AFB.
The finding that idealistic ethical position impacts intention to fake is
further support for the continued use of warnings (Dwight & Donovan, 2002;
Schenk & Sullivan, 2010). Based on these novel findings, warnings may be most
effective if they elicit recall of applicant’s ethical moral code. It is important to note
that some research suggests that in certain scenarios, warnings can enhance faking
by introducing or making the concept of AFB more salient (Dwight & Donovan,
2002). Further exploration is needed to determine if warning’s benefits outweigh
the drawbacks.
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Lastly, identification of applicant characteristics of fakers may inform
selection processes and recruitment. For example, specific questions could be asked
during interviews to assess the relevant characteristics of fakers. Additionally,
knowledge of the drivers of AFB may influence recruiters and their processes of
selecting candidates for nomination.
Limitations and Future Research
A limitation in this study was the low participant response rate in Phase 2
(5.4%). Low response rates may lead to non-response bias, however, a metaanalysis conducted by Groves and Peytcheva (2008) demonstrated that nonresponse rate is not predictive of the degree of nonresponse bias.
A primary reason for the low response rate was the four to eight week time
disparity between Phase 1 and 2. Given this disparity and the non-threatening
survey design, it can be assumed that the vast majority of non-responders were
passive. Passive non-respondents are those who did not return the survey for
contextual reasons (e.g. did not receive the survey, forgot about it, couldn’t
complete it due to other commitments, etc.; Rogelberg et al., 2003). Bias is not
created by passive non-respondents unless the survey constructs assessed are
related to the reasons passive non-respondents fail to respond (e.g. workload,
business, forgetfulness; Rogelberg & Stanton, 2007). This does not apply to this
study and therefore, it may be safe to assume no bias was introduced from passive
non-respondents.
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The challenge with low response rate is not knowing whether there is a
significant difference between responders and nonresponders that would influence
the relationships under investigation (Baruch & Holtom, 2008). To determine if a
significant difference existed between these two groups, a t-test was utilized to
compare responses on the SCS in Phase 1. Although the results were significant,
the numerical mean score difference and the effect size (d = .17) was minimal. This
minor evidence suggests the differences between the two groups may not have an
impact on the relationships investigated although it does suggest that those who
responded may be slightly more conscientious. Without additional data available to
compare the groups, we must retain this limitation and consider it while
interpreting the results of the study. It is important to note, however, that this
research design does have a precedent for low response rates (e.g. Arthur, Glaze,
Villado, & Taylor, 2010; Peterson et al., 2011) and our rates are comparable to
published studies using similar methodologies. Finally, because the remaining
sample was overall more conscientious, these respondents would have less
opportunity to fake than the population because of our operationalization of AFB.
This suggests that the effect sizes observed in this study were attenuated and the
final observed estimates were conservative.
Future research should further explore the magnitude of non-respondents
within this survey design that are passive and active. Active non-respondent are
those who consciously decide not to reply and have a greater potential for
introducing systematic response bias. Historically, however, non-respondents
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represent such a small portion of the sample that they have no impact on results.
Future research could leverage focus groups and interviews with random groups
from the population to estimate the proportion of active to passive non-responders.
If the results indicate a low proportion, there is little concern for bias. However, if
the results indicate active non-respondents upwards to 15%, generalizability may
be impacted.
A second potential limitation of this study is the use of difference scores as
a measure of faking. There has been criticism for measuring change through
difference scores (Edwards, 1994). It has been suggested that difference scores are
unreliable. However, there are researchers who have demonstrated that different
scores are not necessarily unreliable (e.g. Gollwitzer, Christ, & Lemmer; Tisak &
Smith, 1994). McFarland and Ryan (2006) support the use of difference scores
using this study’s AFB methodology, especially when comparing the alternative of
utilizing social desirability scales. Additionally, much research has supported the
use of difference scores when participant-by-treatment interaction is expected and
when both test measures are reliable (Rogosa, Brandt, & Zimowski, 1982; Tisak &
Smith, 1994); which is the case in this study. As recommended by Johns (1981),
the reliabilities for the test measures as well as the difference score measure were
reported in the Results section. All measures demonstrated good reliability (Pre
SCS, α = .9; Post SCS, α = .88; Faking (Difference Scale), α = .79).
In addition to unreliability, utilizing difference scores to measure faking
constrains the amount of faking an individual can engage in. Specifically, an
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individual’s magnitude of faking is limited to the range between their response
score in the honest phase to the maximum score on the scale (Raymark & Tafero,
2009). Although using difference scores to measure faking is common practice in
AFB research (e.g. Griffith et al. 2006; Donovan & Dwight, 2013), additional
methodologies for measuring faking should continue to be explored.
A third limitation of this study were the convergent and discriminant
validity concerns unveiled during the validity assessment of the CFA for the
hypothesized model. Normative Outcomes demonstrated low convergent and
divergent validity while Utilitarian Outcomes demonstrated low discriminant
validity. As a result, we remain cautious when evaluating the validity of the
indicators used for normative and utilitarian outcomes (Farrell, 2009). These results
causes interpretation issues for these latent exogenous variables and their
hypothesized relationships. For this reason, caution should be taken when
interpreting this study’s results demonstrating a non-significant direct path between
Utilitarian Outcomes and Attitude toward Faking and significant direct paths
between Normative Outcomes and Intentions as well as Normative Outcomes and
Attitude toward Faking. Future research should revisit the Utilitarian and
Normative Outcomes scales for revision opportunities to improve these scales’
internal reliability and validity.
A fourth limitation of this study was the potential for common method bias
(CMB). Common Method Bias is variance that is attributed to the measurement
method instead of to the measurement constructs. With the exception of the Phase 1
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CSC measure, all variables were measured at the same time and utilized self-report
responding. Therefore, there is initial concern that the observations made in this
study were a result of the CMB, rather than the constructs and therefore may
influence the direction and magnitude of the relationships (Podsakoff, et al., 2012).
Podsakoff et al. (2012) suggest a number of procedural and statistical remedies for
CMB. This study incorporated as many procedural remedies as the design
permitted, including: proximal and temporal separation; variable scale properties
including different Likert scale points (five vs. seven) and formats (Likert vs.
semantic differential); improved scale items (e.g. less ambiguous items); and use of
positively and negatively framed items. Statistically, this study tested for CMB
effects using a CLF approach. With indications of potential CMB, the structural
model was also analyzed with the retained CLF factor (See Figure 9; Podsakoff, et
al., 2012)
Additional future research should further explore how habit of deception
fits into the explanation of AFB if at all. In addition to refining or using different
measures, future research should explore habit of deception as a moderator between
intent to fake and AFB. Past research has demonstrated habit as a significant
moderator between intention and a behavior (Triandis, 1977; Gardner, de Brujin, &
Lally, 2011).
One of the most compelling finding of this study was the significant
relationship between attitude toward personality measures and attitude toward
AFB. Future research should continue to test this relationship to garner additional
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support for this finding. Additionally, although personality measures were elected
the target for this study, additional targets should be explored (i.e. the organization
administering the personality measure). Having a more comprehensive
understanding of the influence of targets on AFB has potential to have significant
impacts on organizations’ approach to mitigate, deter, and manage AFB.
This research was the first to test the hypothesized relationships using a
two-phase within-subjects design that measured faking using difference scores
incorporating real applicant data. This methodology has been touted as the “goldstandard” of faking research design (Ryan & Boyce, 2006). To reliably test AFB
theory and draw logical comparisons across studies, it is recommended that future
research strives to utilize this research design. Using this methodology will allow
the research area to confidently mount valid evidence that will shape how we
interpret and understand AFB.
This study examined many variables that influence AFB with the purpose of
increasing our understanding of AFB antecedents. The intent was not to test a
comprehensive model of all variables that impact AFB. Future research should
leverage this research and continue the AFB antecedent discussion by exploring
new variables and retest previously tested ones that may influence AFB. Once a
more comprehensive understanding of the dynamics between AFB antecedents are
understood, research should explore in more depth the most appropriate measures
to alleviate the effects of faking.
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Conclusion
The primary purpose of this study was to introduce and test a new, attitudefocused, theoretical model of AFB, and the findings contribute valuable insights to
the faking discussion. As one of the first AFB studies to utilize a within subjects
design with real applicant data, the results may provide new context-congruent
information to help guide researchers and practitioners. Researchers have called for
testing of habits to better understand the automatic processing involved in faking
behavior. This study demonstrated habit of deception was not a predictor of faking
behavior and that future explorations into the influence of habits should carefully
consider its operationalization. Additionally, this study introduced a new variable
to the AFB literature, Attitude toward Personality Measures. Results from this
study highlighted the potential value for the inclusion of this variable in AFB
hypothesis modelling, as well it’s consideration in the selection setting to deter
AFB. Lastly, this study was the first to find support for idealism as a predictor of
intention to fake. This finding is promising for the commonly theorized value of
morality as a key factor for predicting individual AFB. In summary, backed by
gold-standard testing design, this study provides continued support for the value of
integrating attitude theory with AFB and provides unique findings with novel
variables that can be leveraged in future AFB theory and considerations for
practical application.
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Appendix: Survey Measures
Summated Conscientiousness Scale
On the scale provided, please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree
with each of the following statements:
1
Strongly
Disagree

2
Disagree

3
Somewhat
Disagree

4
Somewhat
Agree

5
Agree

6
Strongly
Agree

1. In order to be successful, it is necessary for me to set goals.
2. I feel it is important to complete all of the tasks in a project and not cut corners.
3. I work harder than most people do in general.
4. If I can get away with it, I will take an extra break while completing a project. (R)
5. People rely on me to complete duties/tasks.
6. I have set goals for my future.
7. I am usually considered a dedicated individual.
8. I conduct myself in a safe manner at all times.
9. I engage in activities that go above and beyond what I am expected.
10. I accept responsibility for my actions.
11. Items in my work area are neatly organized.
12. I strive for excellence in everything I do.
13. I complete projects from start to finish.
14. I plan activities in advance.
15. It is easy for me to stay focused on challenging tasks.
16. I show that I am responsible to others.
17. Sometimes when I borrow something, I return it broken or damaged. (R)
18. Friends say that I am a trustworthy individual.
19. Being given important tasks is important to me.
20. I delay completing projects if they can be finished tomorrow. (R)

Utilitarian Outcomes

Use the following rating scale to indicate how much you agree with the following
statements.
1
Strongly
Disagree

2
Disagree

3
Somewhat
Disagree

4
Neither
Agree nor
Disagree
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5
Somewhat
Agree

6
Agree

7
Strongly
Agree

1. I believe that faking on an applicant personality measure will yield good
results for me
2. I believe that faking on an applicant personality measure will bring good
outcomes to me
3. I believe that faking on an applicant personality measure will be good for
me
Attitude toward Target

Use the following rating scale to indicate how much you agree with the following
statements.
1
Strongly
Disagree

2
Disagree

3
Somewhat
Disagree

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

4
Neither
Agree nor
Disagree

5
Somewhat
Agree

6
Agree

7
Strongly
Agree

I do not like filling out applicant personality measures (R)
Applicant personality measures are fun to fill out
I enjoy filling out applicant personality measures
Applicant personality measures are exciting to fill out
I hate filling out applicant personality measures (R)
A lot can be learned from information gathered from applicant personality
measures
7. Nothing good comes from completing applicant personality measures (R)
8. Applicant personality measures are useful ways to gather information
9. Completing applicant personality measures is a waste of time (R)

Self-Report Habit Index

Use the following rating scale to indicate how much you agree with the following
statements.
1
Strongly
Disagree

2
Disagree

3
Somewhat
Disagree

4
Neither
Agree nor
Disagree

5
Somewhat
Agree

Being deceptive is something…
1. I do frequently
2. I do automatically
3. I do without having to consciously remember
4. that makes me feel weird if I do not do it
5. I do without thinking
6. that would require effort not to do
7. that belongs to my daily routine
8. I start doing before I realize I’m doing it
9. I would find hard not to do
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6
Agree

7
Strongly
Agree

10. I have no need to think about doing
11. that’s typically “me”
12. I have been doing for a long time

Subjective Norm Concerning Faking Behavior
Use the following rating scale to indicate how much you agree with the following
statements.
1
Strongly
Disagree

2
Disagree

3
Neither Agree
nor Disagree

4
Agree

5
Strongly
Agree

1. Most people who are important to me would look down on me if I faked on
an applicant personality measure.
2. Most people whose opinions I value would approve of me faking on an
applicant personality measure.
3. It is expected of me that I fake on applicant personality measures.
4. Most other applicants fake on the applicant personality measures.
5. No-one who is important to me would care if I faked on an applicant
personality measure.

Attitude toward Faking
Use the following scales to describe your views of applicant faking behavior.
Good
Pleasant
Foolish
Useful
Unattractive

1
1
1
1
1

2
2
2
2
2

3
3
3
3
3

4
4
4
4
4

5
5
5
5
5

Bad
Unpleasant
Wise
Useless
Attractive

Intention to Fake
Use the following rating scale to indicate how much you agree with the following
statements.
1
Strongly
Disagree

2
Disagree

3
Neither Agree
nor Disagree

4
Agree

5
Strongly
Agree

1. I would never fake on an applicant personality measure.
2. I intend to fake on future applicant personality measures.
3. I will make an effort to fake on future applicant personality measures.
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Ethical Position
Use the following rating scale to indicate how much you agree with the following
statements.
1
Complete
ly
Disagree

2
Largel
y
Disagr
ee

3
Moderate
ly
Disagree

4
Slightl
y
Disagr
ee

5
Neither
Agree
Nor
Disagr
ee

6
Slightl
y
Agree

7
Moderate
ly Agree

8
Largel
y
Agree

9
Complete
ly Agree

1. People should make certain that their actions never intentionally harm
another even to a small degree.
2. Risks to another should never be tolerated, irrespective of how small the
risks might be.
3. The existence of potential harm to others is always wrong, irrespective of
the benefits to be gained.
4. One should never psychologically or physically harm another person.
5. One should not perform an action which might in any way threaten the
dignity and welfare of another individual.
6. If an action could harm an innocent other, then it should not be done.
7. Deciding whether or not to perform an act by balancing the positive
consequences of the act against the negative consequences of the act is
immoral.
8. The dignity and welfare of the people should be the most important concern
in any society.
9. It is never necessary to sacrifice the welfare of others.
10. Moral behaviors are actions that closely match ideals of the most “perfect”
action.
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Table 3
CFA Model Fit
Fit
Measure
χ2

Recommended
Value

DF

Value for
Model
536.65
272

p-value

> .05

.00

GFI

> .95

.90

AGFI

> .80

.87

CFI

> .95

.95

SRMR

< .08

.04

RMSEA

< .05

.05

Note: Recommended values based on Hu and Bentler (1999)
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Table 4
CFA Model Fit with the CLF retained
Fit
Measure
χ2

Recommended
Value

DF

Value for
Model
442.19
247

p-value

> .05

.000

GFI

> .95

.92

AGFI

> .80

.86

CFI

> .95

.97

SRMR

< .08

.04

RMSEA

< .05

.05

Note: Recommended values based on Hu and Bentler (1999)
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Table 5
SEM Model Fit
Fit Measure

Recommended
Value

χ2

Value for
Model
563.16

DF

279

p-value

> .05

.000

GFI

> .95

.90

AGFI

> .80

.87

CFI

> .95

.95

SRMR

< .08

.04

RMSEA

< .05

.05

Note: Recommended values based on Hu and Bentler (1999)
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Table 6
Skewness and Kurtosis for All Items and Parcels
Indicator
Post-SCS_1
Post-SCS_2
Post-SCS_3
Post-SCS_4
Post-SCS_5
Post-SCS_6
Post-SCS_7
Post-SCS_8
Post-SCS_9
Post-SCS_10
Post-SCS_11
Post-SCS_12
Post_SCS_13
Post_SCS_14
Post_SCS_15
Post_SCS_16
Post_SCS_17
Post_SCS_18
Post_SCS_19
Post_SCS_20
Normative_1
Normative_2
Normative_3
Normative_4
Normative_5
Intention-fake_1
Intention-fake_2
Intention-fake_3
Utilitarian_1
Utilitarian_2
Utilitarian_3
Att-Measures_1
Att-Measures_2
Att-Measures_3
Att-Measures_4
Att-Measures_5
Att-Measures_6
Att-Measures_7
Att-Measures_8
Att-Measures_9
Att-Faking_1
Att-Faking_2
Att-Faking_3
Att-Faking_4
Att-Faking_5
Idealism_1
Idealism_2
Idealism_3
Idealism_4
Idealism_5
Idealism_6
Idealism_7
Idealism_8

Skewness
-1.79
-1.56
-0.83
-0.67
-1.53
-1.14
-1.07
-1.11
-0.75
-1.94
-0.93
-1.19
-1.10
-0.98
-1.21
-1.36
-2.85
-2.38
-1.31
-0.78
0.92
1.24
1.89
-0.12
0.87
1.27
1.72
2.06
1.21
0.75
1.26
0.19
0.18
0.20
0.33
-0.04
-0.79
-0.81
-0.80
-0.88
-1.59
-1.41
-1.42
-1.02
-1.33
-1.88
-1.53
-1.36
-1.80
-1.57
-2.11
0.21
-1.06

Kurtosis
4.59
3.87
1.29
-0.38
3.98
1.12
1.63
0.89
0.49
7.63
0.31
1.67
1.53
0.89
2.03
4.15
9.46
10.79
2.36
-0.21
0.08
1.10
3.45
-0.16
-0.06
0.88
2.74
4.74
0.68
-0.45
1.18
-0.95
-0.66
-0.73
-0.52
-0.82
0.10
0.47
0.26
0.31
1.60
1.09
0.94
-0.21
0.86
4.72
2.46
1.77
4.11
3.52
6.10
-1.14
1.10

112

Idealism_9
Idealism_10
Hab-Deception_1
Hab-Deception_2
Hab-Deception_3
Hab-Deception_4
Hab-Deception_5
Hab-Deception_6
Hab-Deception_7
Hab-Deception_8
Hab-Deception_9
HabDeception_10
HabDeception_11
HabDeception_12
Pre-SCS_1
Pre-SCS_2
Pre-SCS_3
Pre-SCS_4
Pre-SCS_5
Pre-SCS_6
Pre-SCS_7
Pre-SCS_8
Pre-SCS_9
Pre-SCS_10
Pre-SCS_11
Pre-SCS_12
Pre-SCS_13
Pre-SCS_14
Pre-SCS_15
Pre-SCS_16
Pre-SCS_17
Pre-SCS_18
Pre-SCS_19
Pre_SCS_20
P1_Att_meas
P2_Att_meas
P3_Att_meas
P1_ideal
P2_ideal
P3_ideal
P1_deception
P2_deception
P3_deception

-0.70
-0.63
2.51
2.40
2.22
2.53
2.22
2.43
3.26
2.11
2.81
0.34

-0.61
-0.10
7.47
6.73
4.75
6.09
4.66
6.12
14.23
4.54
8.81
-1.61

2.89

10.97

2.45

6.06

-1.91
-3.48
-0.88
-1.42
-1.69
-1.41
-2.37
-1.40
-1.55
-1.62
-1.00
-1.34
-1.24
-0.99
-1.60
-1.03
-2.88
-2.96
-1.81
-1.60

6.00
19.34
0.95
0.94
4.84
1.37
11.69
1.45
3.75
0.99
0.19
1.38
0.54
0.92
4.85
-0.15
14.69
17.79
5.21
3.90

-0.04
-0.03
-0.38
-0.29
-0.45
-0.42
0.65
2.15
1.79

-0.41
-0.26
0.16
0.05
-0.38
-0.46
0.15
5.93
3.49
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Table 7
Indirect effects for the structural model
Habit

Idealism

AttMeasures

Utilitarian

Normative

AttFaking

Intention

0.004

0.004

0.006

0.006

0.019

0

Faking

-0.016

-0.068

-0.027

-0.026

0.274

-0.019

Variables with no indirect effects with any other variable were removed from this table
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Figure 8
Structural Model
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Figure 9
Structural Model with CLF retained (CMB corrected measures)
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Figure 10
Structural Model with AFB represented as a latent variable
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